## Round 1 v West Virginia

### Doomsday rep’s

#### Our specific reps – even if doomsday – are good. Spur needed movements

Joppke '91

(Christian - professor of political and social sciences at the European University Institute — The British Journal of Sociology - March - via J-Store)

Since the ecology and anti-nuclear movements lack a well-defined group basis, they all the more depend on the public attention to the issues they address. The new risks must be drawn as imminent and global, otherwise Olson's mobilization barrier could not be overcome. No looming threat of disaster or prospect of immediate 'collective bads', no collective action. 12 As a result, doomsday visions, Angst, and a sense of utmost urgency prosper in these movements'. ' After all, they emerge in reaction to policies on the brink of implementation, large-scale technologies in the process of realization or air and water already polluted. Considering their temporal position, there is no time to lose because too much time has already been lost.

#### Dystopic images are an antidote to fear – they counteract fatalism and catalyze debates to alter the future

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Constellations Volume 11 No 4 2004

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Anxiety and fear K’s wrong and cause anti-politics

**Buss ‘97**

(Psychological Inquiry, 8, David, Department of Psychology at University of Texas)

A central premise in TMT is that the evolution of human intellectual capacities brought about with it the unfortunate consequences of awareness of our own mortality. This awareness is presumed to cause “paralyzing terror,” which renders goal-directed activities impossible unless it is subverted through psychological means. An unexamined premise in this theory is the origin of terror or anxiety itself. Precisely why awareness of death should provoke anxiety is unclear. Why wouldn’t such awareness provoke a host of other phenomena, such as careful planning of one’s life or a surge of hedonic sexual promiscuity? Presumably, we need an explanation for why such awareness would produce anxiety and not some other psychological state, but I could not discern in their article a rationale for this premise. Self-esteem is proposed as an evolved mechanism designed to protect us from anxiety, but a prior question is why we have anxiety-producing mechanisms to begin with. If the distribution of fears and phobias is any indication, the human anxiety appears to be highly domain specific and tailored to particular adaptive problems. We tend to develop fears of snakes, spiders, darkness, heights, and strangers, all of which were presumably hazardous to our survival in human ancestral environments (Marks, 1587). Moreover, anxiety about social exclusion may have specific survival functions, such as ensuring the protection and resources of the group and reproductive functions such as ensuring access to potential mates (Buss, 1990). Thus anxiety, rather than being a byproduct of our greater cognitive capabilities leading to awareness of death seems tailored, at least in part, to the solution of specific problems of survival and reproduction.

#### Predictions are methodologically sound, reflexive, and increasingly accurate.

Ruud **van der Helm** is a Dutch policy officer on instrument development in the Aid Effectiveness and Policy Department. Futures – Volume 41, Issue 2, Pages 67-116 (March **2009**) – obtained via Science Direct

Futurists build and discuss statements on future states of affairs. When their work is challenged, they cannot defend ‘‘what may come to be’’ with robust forms of proof. They have no direct observation, can design no experiments, and cannot accumulate data sets. All the work, all the discussions of validity, have to rely on indirect reasoning based on current and past observations, experiments and data. Such reasoning is fragile and subject to considerable uncertainty. Ever since the field emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, futurists have been acutely aware of the special challenge this implies, including two most obvious consequences. First, even the most serious work is vulnerable to potentially devastating criticism. This has triggered an on-going effort of theoretical justification that has accompanied the development of the Futures field. Second, in relation to this, sound methodology is crucially important to provide support when exploring such insecure ground as professional and academic speculation on possible futures. It is not surprising that methodology has constantly been one – and often the – central concern of the field, sometimes to a point of excess. As early as 1980, De´coufle´ could warn companion futurists against the urge ‘‘to jump steps in the long and difficult progression towards the still hypothetical scientificity of conjectural work by displaying inappropriate complacency for issues of method’’. Whether or not some futurists do ‘jump steps’, the Futures field has consistently shown much reflexivity on its theoretical foundations and its methodological procedures. However, the nature of the theoretical and methodological challenges to be addressed by such reflexivity changes over time. The doctrines, the methodological resources, the knowledge-base, the organisation of discussion in the field, that once provided the basis for successfully meeting the challenges of a given era may become inadequate or irrelevant if the context comes to change in a major way. Our argument in this special issue is that such a major change in the challenges that have to be met by our field is now well under way, calling for a major re-examination and renewal of the theoretical underpinnings of futures work.1 Deepening and refining the diagnosis of the changing context of FS is of course one part of the task ahead of us. But to launch the effort, and show its necessity, let us just sketch a rough picture of the situation, by reviewing three important aspects of the development of the Futures field: (1) practical necessity and finalisation, (2) peculiarity and separation, and (3) methodology-based development. Confronted with strident criticism on the possibility and legitimacy of any serious study of future situations, the strongest argument put forward by many pioneers of the Futures field was that studying possible futures was necessary for action and decision-making. As expressed by Bertrand de Jouvenel (1964): ‘‘One always foresees, without richness of data, without awareness of method, without critique nor cooperation. It is now urgent and important to give this individual and natural activity a cooperative, organised character, and submit it to growing demands of intellectual rigor’’. This has proved a decisive basis for the development of the field, fromthe1960s to thep resent day. It has led to a situation where most works on futures are legitimised through their connection to business management, to public decision-making, or both. The success of foresight in the recent years is an illustration of the strength of this covenant between futures methodology and the needs of long-term, strategic, management and policy. The downside of thus using the contribution to decision-making as the main theoretical justification and as the backbone of methodological design in futures work has been, and is now, a constant weakening of the effort to explore and develop other bases for theoretical foundation and methodological development. Although many such avenues have been opened, they have not been explored very far, because the evaluation of new methods has been based on their adequacy in serving studies designed for the preparation of decision-making, or of collective action.

### Warming

#### Link turn – warming leads to ice age

Calvin 98 – theoretical neurophysicist @ U of W

William H. Calvin, Theoretical Neurophysicist at the University of Washington in Seattle, "The great climate flip-flop," The Atlantic Monthly 281:47-64

There are a few obvious precursors to flushing failure. One is diminished wind chill, when winds aren't as strong as usual, or as cold, or as dry — as is the case in the Labrador Sea during the North Atlantic Oscillation. This El Niño-like shift in the atmospheric-circulation pattern over the North Atlantic, from the Azores to Greenland, often lasts a decade. At the same time that the Labrador Sea gets a lessening of the strong winds that aid salt sinking, Europe gets particularly cold winters. It's happening right now: a North Atlantic Oscillation started in 1996. Another precursor is more floating ice than usual, which reduces the amount of ocean surface exposed to the winds, in turn reducing evaporation. Retained heat eventually melts the ice, in a cycle that recurs about every five years. Yet another precursor, as Henry Stommel suggested in 1961, would be the addition of fresh water to the ocean surface, diluting the salt-heavy surface waters before they became unstable enough to start sinking. More rain falling in the northern oceans — exactly what is predicted as a result of global warming — could stop salt flushing. So could ice carried south out of the Arctic Ocean. There is also a great deal of unsalted water in Greenland's glaciers, just uphill from the major salt sinks. The last time an abrupt cooling occurred was in the midst of global warming. Many ice sheets had already half melted, dumping a lot of fresh water into the ocean. A brief, large flood of fresh water might nudge us toward an abrupt cooling even if the dilution were insignificant when averaged over time. The fjords of Greenland offer some dramatic examples of the possibilities for freshwater floods. Fjords are long, narrow canyons, little arms of the sea reaching many miles inland; they were carved by great glaciers when the sea level was lower. Greenland's east coast has a profusion of fjords between 70°N and 80°N, including one that is the world's biggest. If blocked by ice dams, fjords make perfect reservoirs for meltwater. Glaciers pushing out into the ocean usually break off in chunks. Whole sections of a glacier, lifted up by the tides, may snap off at the "hinge" and become icebergs. But sometimes a glacial surge will act like an avalanche that blocks a road, as happened when Alaska's Hubbard glacier surged into the Russell fjord in May of 1986. Its snout ran into the opposite side, blocking the fjord with an ice dam. Any meltwater coming in behind the dam stayed there. A lake formed, rising higher and higher — up to the height of an eight-story building. Eventually such ice dams break, with spectacular results. Once the dam is breached, the rushing waters erode an ever wider and deeper path. Thus the entire lake can empty quickly. Five months after the ice dam at the Russell fjord formed, it broke, dumping a cubic mile of fresh water in only twenty-four hours. The Great Salinity Anomaly, a pool of semi-salty water derived from about 500 times as much unsalted water as that released by Russell Lake, was tracked from 1968 to 1982 as it moved south from Greenland's east coast. In 1970 it arrived in the Labrador Sea, where it prevented the usual salt sinking. By 1971-1972 the semi-salty blob was off Newfoundland. It then crossed the Atlantic and passed near the Shetland Islands around 1976. From there it was carried northward by the warm Norwegian Current, whereupon some of it swung west again to arrive off Greenland's east coast — where it had started its inch-per-second journey. So freshwater blobs drift, sometimes causing major trouble, and Greenland floods thus have the potential to stop the enormous heat transfer that keeps the North Atlantic Current going strong.

### Econ

#### Act to save the most lives – imperfect knowledge doesn’t justify inaction

**Cowen ‘04** (Tyler, Professor of Economics – George Mason University, “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism”, 11-2, <http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf>, p. 14-15)

**The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances.** This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. The critique may give the impression of relying more heavily on a more plausible assumption, namely a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. **But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument**. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. **Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack** and one million children have contracted smallpox. We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. **If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works**. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. **Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other.** That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. **Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible**. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. **We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.”** Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. **We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive**. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of three to six hundred thousand children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important. **We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected the cure the greater number of children.**  **This example** may appear excessively simple, but it **points our attention to the non-generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.**

#### We control uniqueness – heg reducing global violence

**Barnett 9-19-11** (Thomas PM, chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine, World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Credit the U.S., Not the U.N., for More Peaceful World” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10047/the-new-rules-credit-the-u-s-not-the-u-n-for-more-peaceful-world>, jj)

Thanks to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the wars they spawned, **many people around the world think they're living through the most dangerous, violent and strategically uncertain period in human history. Well, that simply isn't true**, as **the most recent Human Security Report** from Canada's Simon Fraser University makes clear. Entitled, "The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War," the 2009-2010 edition of the annual report **marshals a ton of solid data that proves our world is less violent than ever** and that it has "become far less insecure over the past 20 years." The major failing of this otherwise brilliant report is its refusal to give America any credit for this historic shift, which the authors credit to NATO and the United Nations as the "international community" of note. But before addressing that lapse, let me focus on the unabashedly good news. First, **classic interstate warfare continues to decline. If in the 1950s we suffered an average of 6 to 7 interstate or international wars per year, now we're down to less than one -- despite the number of states in the world having roughly doubled** across those six decades. Though the report notes the complete absence of great-power war since 1945, it repeatedly refuses to adequately credit nuclear weapons on that score**. War, the "eternal scourge," apparently went the way of the dinosaur once America achieved** nuclear **superpower status and exerted itself globally**, but the report pretends it was all the U.N.'s doing -- kind of like crediting the referee with winning the game. Second, **since the Cold War ended, civil wars have started dropping in frequency as well, with the worst ones -- 1,000 or more dead in a year -- declining by more than two-thirds. So not only are there fewer wars, they are less lethal. The average international war of the 1950s killed 20,000 people a year. Today, that number stands at less than 3,000. Not bad for a world allegedly suffering "uncontrollable" WMD proliferation and "perpetual war."** Third, the biggest theater of warfare and killing since World War II has been Asia. Initially, there was China's civil war and Mao's murderous rule, then the Korean bloodletting followed by Vietnam, where 300,000 died in 1972 alone. But in 2008, the region suffered less than 1,000 "battle deaths." The report's tentative academic judgment here confirms what any historian of modern globalization knows as fact: "East Asia's post-Vietnam history appears to support claims that rising incomes lead to fewer wars." It should come as no surprise that, as East Asia spent the past several decades successfully joining the global economy, warfare disappeared. But how do all these great powers rise simultaneously without turning on each other militarily? **Might there have been some extra-regional military Leviathan that provided the "glue" for this unprecedented regional dynamic?** Or was this the work of the United Nations? Fourth, while the frequency of subnational violence -- whether involving the state or strictly between subnational communities -- has increased by a quarter since 2003, the large bulk of these conflicts are low-intensity, meaning fewer than 1,000 battle deaths in a year. **So-called high-intensity conflicts -- more than 3 deaths a day -- have dropped globally in frequency by almost four-fifths since the end of the Cold War. This means that in a world of almost 7 billion people, less than 30,000 people are dying from warfare every year. That puts the global scourge of "perpetual war" on par with male deaths due to lung cancer in India. But my personal favorite decline concerns deaths from "one-sided violence," otherwise known as government militaries and/or nonstate armies slaughtering civilians, which were at their lowest in 2008 -- the latest year of record -- since researchers began keeping records in 1989**. Where has the vast majority of such killing occurred since Cold War's end? Africa. Which continent has experienced the greatest recent explosion of globalization connectivity and middle class emergence? That again would be Africa. Judging by Asia's experience over the past 35 years, that's good news. **Finally, what about the notion that wars are growing longer? Absolutely untrue**, according to the report, which notes, "**In each decade since the 1970s, the percentage of conflicts that lasted 10 years or more has declined.**" Again, the dominant global trend since the 1970s has been the stunning expansion of globalization, beginning with Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China. It turns out that this isn't a case of "perpetual war for perpetual peace" after all, as many critics of my unabashedly pro-globalization vision have long alleged. Instead, **globalization and America's muscular support for its expansion just so happens to coincide with the greatest reduction in global violence ever seen**. As for the Human Security Report's prognosis on what lies ahead? "While the future remains impossible to predict and will surely deliver some unpleasant surprises as it has in the past, **there are no obvious countervailing system-level forces that appear powerful enough to reverse the positive effects of the trends we have identified." Does that sound like a "post-American world" to you?** Now on to my major gripe: The report credits the U.N. and the "international community" with the bulk of these developments. We are told repeatedly throughout the text that the key system-level development that unleashed all this peace was the end of the Cold War, which did bring an end to the superpower proxy wars in the Third World. But let's be clear about one thing: While the Soviet Union's military left the playing field, America's did not. Compared to the 1980s, America's crisis-response activity quadrupled in the 1990s, as measured in crisis-response days put in by the U.S. Marines, Navy, Air Force and Army in the post-Cold War period. In other words, **America's military became profoundly more involved in managing the world's security after the Soviet threat disappeared**. Yet, the Human Security Report repeatedly alleges that the end of the Cold War unleashed the power of the United Nations! As the report notes, the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts did increase by 700 percent from its tiny Cold War baseline, but that did not make the difference the authors repeatedly claim. To underscore the point, **just imagine a post-Cold War world where the U.S.** -- and along with it NATO **-- had disappeared from global security management just like post-Soviet Russia did. What kind of security role would the U.N. have been in a position to play in such an environment?** **The Human Security Report series put out by Simon Fraser University in Canada is the single best stream of analysis on global security trends out there. Its only shortcoming is the painfully transparent analytical acrobatics that it goes through to deny the United States military its due credit in helping to create a global system that has rolled back war across the world.**

#### Security competition over energy resources is inevitable --- realism is the best approach to the topic

Dannreuther ‘10

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POLINARES working paper n. 8, POLINARES – EU Policy on Natural Resources, POLINARES is a project designed to help identify the main global challenges relating to competition for access to resources, and to propose new approaches to collaborative solutions,

September 2010, International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict, <http://www.polinares.eu/docs/d1-1/polinares_wp1_ir_theories.pdf>, jj

2. Realism, neo-Realism and Geopolitics

Realism is often seen historically as the dominant IR theory and this is certainly correct in terms of the study of security, conflict and war. This is reflected in the fact that International Security, as noted above the flagship IR journal, is dominated by realist and neo-realist authors. Classical realism includes the key early and mid-twentieth century scholars who developed a notion of the ‘tragic’ nature of international politics, arguing that there was a radical difference between politics within a state and politics between states since inter-state politics lacks any overarching sovereign arbiter who is able authoritatively to repress the inexorable drive for power and the natural human tendency towards aggression (for key texts, see Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1960; Neibuhr 1960). The logical consequence is that the international realm is chracterised by anarchy, distrust and the ever-present prospect of war. Much of realism’s initial momentum and subsequent popularity came from its critique of inter-war liberalism (or so-called idealism) and the optimism expressed by may liberals that international relations could be transformed through developing international law and international institutions such as the League of Nations (see especially Carr 1946). In 1979, Kenneth Waltz provided a more rigorous and parsimonious model of realism, known as neo-realism, whose main assumptions were that the international system is anarchical, that the structure of the system is determined by the distribution of power between states (the balance of power), and that the internal nature of the state (i.e. whether it is democratic or authoritarian) has no material structural impact on international relations (Waltz, 1979).

Realism’s theoretical principles draw from deeper historical traditions of thinking about international politics and these help to explain the theory’s popularity and theoretical dominance. This includes the tradition of realpolitik developed from Machiavelli onwards, which prioritises the interests of the sovereign, and where the key goal of statesmen seeking to preserve international stability is to contain the ineluctable drive for power by states, and the conflicts this inevitably produces, through the preservation of a durable balance of power. As Kissinger has described, this was the foundation of the European order in the 18th and 19th century (Kissinger 1964). It was an approach to international politics he also sought to resurrect to develop his own foreign policy principles when he was a highly influential US Secretary of State in the 1970s (Kissinger 1979, 1982). Another tradition which realism draws from is that of geopolitics which includes the work of people like Mahan (1890), Mackinder (1919), Haushofer, (2002) Harold and Margaret Spout (1971), and Lipschutz (1989). This tradition draws from geography as well as IR and strategic studies and highlights the spatial dimensions of state power and identifies a continued international struggle for influence and control of critical geographical and geopolitical spaces, whether that be the Eurasian ‘heartland’ favoured by Mackinder or the international sea lanes promoted by Mahan.

Much of the literature on the politics of international energy adopts implicitly a realist and geopolitical theoretical approach, even if this is rarely explicitly developed. The key underlying assumptions and arguments of those who adopt this approach can be reduced to the following:

• Access to and control of natural resources, of which energy is the most critical, is a key ingredient of national power and national interest

• Energy resources are becoming scarcer and more insecure (drawing often from the ‘peak oil’ thesis and the ‘resource curse’ and ‘resource wars’ literature)

• States will increasingly compete for access and control over these resources

• Conflict and war over these resources are increasingly likely, if not inevitable.

A good illustration of this general approach can be seen in the work of Michael Klare who has written prolifically on the international politics of energy and is probably the best-known and most popular writer in the field of IR and energy (see Klare 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008). The core arguments of his various books are essentially realist and can be distilled to:

• In the post-Cold War period, with the end of the ideological clash between socialism and capitalism and the rise of new economic powers, international relations is increasingly focused on gaining or maintaining access to and control of valuable natural resources, which is inextricably linked to the post-Cold War shifts in the balance of power. This is a major source of conflict between the most powerful states: US, China, Russia, EU, Japan, India…etc

• Natural resources, most notably oil, is becoming increasingly scarce due to rising demand in Asia and the prospect of ‘peak oil’.

• Much of the world’s supply of oil, and much of its new supplies such as in Central Asia and Africa, are located in weak, fragile states with multiple inter-state disputes and conflicts and where political and religious extremism is rising. Oil wealth has the paradoxical effect of making these states more powerful international actors, due to their control of vital resources, but also more dysfunctional, more ‘dissatisfied’, revisionist, authoritarian and anti-Western. A link is to be found between resource wealth and the post 9/11 growth of radical Islam and the threat of international terrorism.

• International conflict over oil and other natural resources is thus becoming more and more likely.

This general overarching thesis is undoubtedly a powerful and persuasive framework which captures the political imagination of many analysts and policy-makers, and which needs to be taken into account even by those who might disagree with the underlying assumptions. Such an approach feeds, for example, the concerns of the Chinese leadership see that the insecurity of the Malacca straits, and the prospect of a military embargo of its oil supplies, represents a fundamental threat to China’s core national interests; similarly, it underlay the concerns of the US Congress that CNOOC’s bid for UNOCAL in 2005 would, if successful, represent a critical threat to US national interests and its energy security. It is a theoretical frame which suffuses military planning, such as that of the Pentagon or the PLA or the Russian armed forces, and promotes national defence strategies which incorporate policies to defend perceived vulnerable energy supply sources and transportation routes. It also feeds into more alarmist policy and journalistic accounts of international relations where there has been a burgeoning literature about the new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia, which pits Russia, China and the West in a zero-sum game for control over the region’s energy resources (see Blank 1995; Karasac 2002; Rasizade 2002; Jafar 2004). Similarly, the emergence of a renewed ‘scramble for Africa’ which focuses on the increased global interest in the natural resources of Africa, most notable of which is oil, and which has made this region regain strategic importance and which has incited great power competition (Morris 2006; Taylor 2006; Frynas and Paulo 2007). This realist-driven energy conflict approach also suffuses Western concerns over the rise of China, the fears of Chinese expansion in Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the prospect of increased conflict between China and its regional neighbours, Russia, Japan and India.

**Cap 2ac - Long**

***And, no prior questions --- elevating ontological and philosophical concerns fails and trades off with pragmatic policy solutions***

**Jenkins ‘11**

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51-74 (Article) PROJECT MUSE, jj

Pragmatism: Making Ethics Practical

**Pragmatists** often **introduce their strategy of practical reason with an opening complaint that cosmological strategies of environmental ethics have not proven their practical worth**. **That complaint about effectiveness introduces a pragmatic proposal for less metaphysical debate and more attention to creating broad agreement on policy responses to practical problems**. The editors of the anthology Environmental Pragmatism thus set the scene: On the one hand, the discipline…has produced a wide variety of positions and theories in an attempt to derive morally justifiable and adequate environmental policies. On the other hand, **it is difficult to see what practical effect the field of environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy**. (Light and Katz 1995, 1) Ben Minteer and Robert Manning blame the field’s ineffectiveness on its cosmological innovations: “**urgent calls for new environmental worldviews and radically revised ontological schemes, rather than leading to improved environmental solutions and conditions, only lead ethicists’ attention away from the resources already present within our shared moral and political traditions**.” In consequence, **the field exhibits a “conspicuous silence regarding concrete solutions to real world environmental dilemmas**” (2003, 319). Minteer and Manning follow the problem-solving approach opened by Bryan Norton, who contrasts his authentically “practical philosophy” with “**axiological” value theories** that, in his view, **have narrowed topics of discussion, reduced possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration, and led to a communicative breakdown between science and society** (2003, 47–63). For Norton, **sustainability depends on an integrative, adaptive ethos developed from science-based responses to specific problems** (2005). **Pragmatists thus present their ethic of contextual problem-solving by pressing the dilemma between radical cosmological change and practical political engagement.** **Pragmatists expect environmental ethics to be practical in two ways: (1) by working with available moral resources, (2) for the sake of resolving specific policy problems.** **With both elements working together, they say, ethics can help achieve effective social response to environmental problems**. Andrew **Light thus asks ethicists to attend to cultural contexts by trying to “work within traditional moral psychologies and ethical theories that people already have” in order to create links between existing moral priorities in specific communities and the ends of environmental concern** (2003, 235). **Practical ethics requires, he says, a “practical anthropology,” attentive to the environmental interests and commitments that people hold, with a view toward “generating creative ways to persuade a variety of people” to adopt environmental solutions** (2003, 241).

***2. PERM – do both - Reformism from with-in solves***

**Dixon 1 –** Activist and founding member of Direct Action Network Summer, Chris, “Reflections on Privilege, Reformism, and Activism”, Online

To bolster his critique of 'reformism,' for instance, he critically cites one of the examples in my essay: demanding authentic we need revolutionary strategy that links diverse, everyday struggles and demands to long-term radical objectives, without sacrificing either. Of course, this isn't to say that every so-called 'progressive' ballot initiative or organizing campaign is necessarily radical or strategic. Reforms are not all created equal. But some can fundamentally shake systems of power, leading to enlarged gains and greater space for further advances. Andre Gorz, in his seminal book Strategy for Labor, refers to these as "non-reformist" or "structural" reforms. He contends, "a struggle for non-reformist reforms--for anti-capitalist reforms--is one which does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria, and rationales. A non-reformist reform is determined not in terms of what can be, but what should be." Look to history for examples: the end of slavery, the eight-hour workday, desegregation. All were born from long, hard struggles, and none were endpoints. Yet they all struck at the foundations of power (in these cases, the state, white supremacy, and capitalism), and in the process, they created new prospects for revolutionary change. Now consider contemporary struggles: amnesty for undocumented immigrants, socialized health care, expansive environmental protections, indigenous sovereignty. These and many more are arguably non-reformist reforms as well. None will single-handedly dismantle capitalism or other systems of power, but each has the potential to escalate struggles and sharpen social contradictions. And we shouldn't misinterpret these efforts as simply meliorative incrementalism, making 'adjustments' to a fundamentally flawed system.

***3. Prefer the aff’s incrementalism to the alt’s inaction --- refusal to embrace bridge fuels like the aff guarantees environmental collapse***

Charles K. **Ebinger**, Director, Energy Security Initiative Govinda Avasarala, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative The Brookings Institution 4-22-**10**, Environmental Pragmatism <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0422_environmental_pragmatism_ebinger.aspx>, jj

Finally, **people need to embrace pragmatism**. **Though it is not ideal and rarely a sexy declaration, pragmatism and incrementalism are** the **obligatory** taxes of multilateral agreements (mind you, they are less obtrusive with fewer parties). **There are many tools at our disposal that can put the stalled climate change efforts into first gear**. First, **we must embrace bridge technologies, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and state of the art cleaner coal**. **With total global renewable energy capacity falling catastrophically short of global energy demand, ‘bridge’ technologies can ease the environmental strain while we wait for renewable capacity to reach requisite levels**. In addition, investments in upgrading many nations’ electricity grids will make a remarkable difference in the environmental impact of power generation. **The need for action to reduce climate change is very real, particularly as many emerging economies and failed and near-failed states are most at risk and can potentially spur widespread global unrest**. **Clinging to an inefficient, incapable system will only exacerbate the crisis of inaction at a time where the world can ill-afford it. By focusing on smaller negotiations** with actual large emitters, garnering a better understanding of the real economics behind climate change, **and embracing smaller steps in ‘bridge’ technologies, we can do a far more effective job of getting the ball rolling.**

***4. alt doesn’t solve - Capitalism is inevitable—reforms, not revolution, are the only option.***

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 15- 16)

Capitalism is far too ingrained in American life to eliminate. If you go into the most impoverished areas of America, you will find that the people who live there are not seeking government control over factories or even more social welfare programs; they're hoping, usually in vain, for a fair chance to share in the capitalist wealth. The poor do not pray for socialism-they strive to be a part of the capitalist system. They want jobs, they want to start businesses, and they want to make money and be successful. What's wrong with America is not capitalism as a system but capitalism as a religion. We worship the accumulation of wealth and treat the horrible inequality between rich and poor as if it were an act of God. Worst of all, we allow the government to exacerbate the financial divide by favoring the wealthy: go anywhere in America, and compare a rich suburb with a poor town-the city services, schools, parks, and practically everything else will be better financed in the place populated by rich people. The aim is not to overthrow capitalism but to overhaul it. Give it a social-justice tune-up, make it more efficient, get the economic engine to hit on all cylinders for everybody, and stop putting out so many environmentally hazardous substances. To some people, this goal means selling out leftist ideals for the sake of capitalism. But the right thrives on having an ineffective opposition. The Revolutionary Communist Party helps stabilize the "free market" capitalist system by making it seem as if the only alternative to free-market capitalism is a return to Stalinism. Prospective activists for change are instead channeled into pointless discussions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Instead of working to persuade people to accept progressive ideas, the far left talks to itself (which may be a blessing, given the way it communicates) and tries to sell copies of the Socialist Worker to an uninterested public.

***6. Democratic capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts***

**Kaletsky, ’11** (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic

Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21, bgm)

**Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because,** unlike communism or socialism or feudalism**, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. I**n the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. **The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products.** Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, **democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years.** But regardless of the difference in timescale, **capitalism and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems. And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well.** If we consider **democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine**, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. **In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized, the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”**—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—**becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf.** Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: **"Something will turn up."**

***7. Alt causes violence***

**Pinker ’11** (Steven, the Economist, The violent dangers of ideology; The Q&A: Steven Pinker, Proquest, jj)

You equate Marxist ideology with violence in the book. **Do you think that capitalist values have contributed to the decline of violence?** I think that **communism was a major force for violence for more than 100 years, because it was built into its ideology that progress comes through class struggle, often violent**. **It led to the widespread belief that the only way to achieve justice was to hurry this dialectical process along, and allow the oppressed working classes to carry out their struggle against their bourgeois oppressors**. However ***much we might deplore the profit motive, or consumerist values, if everyone just wants iPods we would probably be better off than if they wanted class revolution.***

#### Coal is inevitable in the world of the alt – turns the K

Wendland ‘11

Joel Wendland is editor of Political Affairs magazine. He is a union member and a US Army veteran.

7-20-11, People’s World, Coal pollution killing poor, people of color, NAACP charges <http://www.peoplesworld.org/coal-pollution-killing-poor-people-of-color-naacp-charges/>, jj

America is addicted to coal, and that addiction is killing poor people and people of color, according to a new report published by the NAACP and other environmental justice organizations. According to the report, emissions from 431 coal plants across the country cause 30,000 premature deaths and tens of thousands incidents of chronic respiratory health problems like asthma, bronchitis and lung cancer each year. According to the study, titled "Coal Blooded: Putting Profits Before People," Sulfur dioxide (SO2) and Nitrogen Oxide (NOx), coal plants produce nearly all of the SO2 and fine particle pollution in the U.S. Coal-powered plants produce about 44 percent of the electricity used in the U.S. Ten states use about half of the total amount of coal-fired electricity produced in the whole country. More than 8 million people live within three miles of a coal power plant, and those people are disproportionately poor or people of color. The average per capita income of those people total less than $19,000, substantially lower than the national average. About 3 million are people of color, the report found. The report also revealed the locations of the worst coal plants in the countries. These "failing plants" produce the most pollution and impact the largest number of poor and people of color. To be precise, 90 "failing plants" across the country produced a quarter of SO2 and one-fifth of NOx emissions in the entire country. More than half of the 4.7 million people who live near these plants are people of color. Of the 90 "failing plants," the report scrutinizes the 12 worst offenders. Three are owned by Edison International and are located in Illinois. PSEG owns two of the worst offenders in Connecticut and New Jersey. Duke Energy, DTE Energy, and Dominion are among the companies whose plants create the greatest harm. Detroit, Michigan is host to one of the worst pollution-producing plants in the country. The River Rouge Power Plant (DTE Energy), located on the southwest edge of the city produces more than 13,000 tons of SO2 and 4,658 tons of NOx each year. The plant is just five miles from downtown Detroit and just across the Rouge River from the only major Latino district in the city, known as "Mexican Town." Of the residents who live within three miles of the River Rouge plant, more than 65 percent are African Americans and Latinos. Average income for people living in the area is just over $13,000 each year. The study attributed 44 premature deaths and hundreds of asthma attacks each year to the pollution from just this one plant. Another deadly culprit is the Hammond, Indiana plant owned by Dominion. Located on outskirts of Chicago, this plant emits almost 17,000 tons of SO2 and NOx pollution. Of the people living within three miles of the plant, almost 80 percent are African Americans and Latinos. In that same corridor along the southern edge of Lake Michigan between Chicago and the Michigan border are six other coal-fired power plants that contribute to the poor health and premature deaths of mostly poor communities of color. The authors of the report called for immediately closing the 90 "failing plants." While they total about 20 percent of the coal-fired plants in the country, they produce less than 10 percent of its electricity. In addition, closing those plants would reduce the number of people living within three miles of a coal-fired plant by 58 percent and reduce the number of emergency room visits, deaths and chronic illnesses by thousands each year.

#### There is no root cause to environmental destruction – assuming so prevents effective solutions to specific issues

**Garrard 4** (Greg, PhD in Humanities and Cultural Industries @ Liverpool U, “Ecocriticism”, pp.

176-178, Questia) JPG

Much **ecocriticism has taken for granted that its task is to overcome anthropocentrism**, just as feminism seeks to overcome androcentrism. The metaphysical argument for biocentrism is meant to sustain moral claims about the intrinsic value of the natural world, which will in turn affect our attitudes and behaviour towards nature. **Wilderness experiences, or apocalyptic threats, or Native American ways of life, are supposed to provide the impetus** or the example by which individuals come **to an authentic selfhood orientated toward right environmental action. Whilst the importance of changing** the **minds** and lives of individuals **is undeniable, this book has aimed to show the political dimension that this moralistic emphasis may occlude.** However, the politicisation of ecocriticism does pose its own problems. Dwelling on the troubling example of Heidegger (Chapter 6), who espoused both Nazism and a kind of deep ecology, Jonathan Bate asserts in The Song of the Earth that 'The dilemma of Green reading is that it must, yet it cannot, separate ecopoetics from ecopolitics' (2000:266). Environmentalism is compatible with most political positions, and while we have seen possible dangers inherent in this, it might also give us a clear argument for better, not less, political attunement in ecocriticism. Bate rightly points out that poets are not the engineers of the world, and that literature cannot provide specific solutions, which means that ecocriticism must continue to adopt and adapt theories from feminist and Marxist traditions, enabling positive engagement in cultural politics. I would argue that the promise of ecofeminist literary and cultural theory has yet to be realised. With important exceptions such as Haraway, Armbruster, Westling and Murphy, such criticism has been held back by the overstated anti-rationalism and gynocentric dualism of radical ecofeminism. The work of Australian philosopher Val Plumwood offers ecofeminism a sound basis for a much-needed critique of the dynamics of domination as they operate in a range of cultural contexts. **A monolithically conceived root cause of environmental destruction**, be it labelled anthropocentrism or androcentrism **is bound to misrepresent the complexity of causation in the real world**. **Ecofeminism**, modified by dialogue with social ecological positions**, can provide insight into the cultural operations of environmental injustice**. In this way, the fusion of environmental and social development agendas that has occurred so strikingly within and between global NGOs might come to ecocriticism; Beyond Nature Writing (2001), edited by Karla Armbruster and Kathleen Wallace, includes several essays in this emergent field of enquiry. Ecocritics therefore continue to experiment with hybridised reading practices, drawing on various philosophical and literary theoretical sources. Bennett and Teague's The Nature of Cities (1999) reveals a new emphasis on bringing cultural theorists such as Cronon, Ross, Luke and Haraway into dialogue with literary ecocritics, thereby consolidating the field around a critical encounter between genres, perspectives and politics. The work of Richard Kerridge is exemplary in this respect: he writes with as much insight about postmodern risk as he does about Thomas Hardy. Harrison's eclectic Forests (1993), which ranges from Grimm fairy tales to the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright, fosters the making of connections between disparate cultural phenomena without eliminating their peculiarities. Bate and Buell first published books that identified a single 'environmental tradition' in Britain and the USA, stemming from Wordsworth and Thoreau respectively. In later works, however, they favour an explicitly dialectical approach. In The Song of the Earth, Wordsworth's piety is leavened with Byron's wit, and Heidegger's portentousness gets a learned sneer from Theodor Adorno. For Buell, Writing for an Endangered World involves juxtaposing urbanites like Theodor Dreiser and Gwendolyn Brooks with the more obvious candidates for ecocritical treatment, Jeffers and Berry. Drawing upon such diverse resources of hope enables ecocriticism to connect with the urban and suburban places in which most of us will continue to live, and will add depth to the ecological critique of modernity; **material and economic progress is no more the root of all evils than it is an unalloyed benefit to people or the natural world**. By such means **the risk of fostering reactionary politics might be minimized.**

#### They have it backwards – large-scale violence leads to structural violence

Goldstein, ’01 (Joshua S., Professor of International Relations at American University, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war – an understanding that would improve the chances of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for – a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet I became somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges, from the evidence in this book, as relatively ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome several dilemmas mentioned in this book. First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Capitalism is key to environmental preservation.

**Taylor, ’03** [Jenny Taylor, senior fellow CATO institute, Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=3073]

Earth Day (April 22) is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate because it's **businessmen** -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow. Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality. There are dozens of studies showing that, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But once per capita income hits between $3,500 and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of pollutants begins to decline just as rapidly as it had previously increased. This relationship is found for virtually every significant pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that wealthier societies are willing to trade-off the economic costs of government regulation for environmental improvements and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. Market agents will supply whatever it is that people are willing to spend money on. And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it. Meanwhile, capitalism rewards efficiency and punishes waste. Profit-hungry companies found ingenious ways to reduce the natural resource inputs necessary to produce all kinds of goods, which in turn reduced environmental demands on the land and the amount of waste that flowed through smokestacks and water pipes. As we learned to do more and more with a given unit of resources, the waste involved (which manifests itself in the form of pollution) shrank. This trend was magnified by the shift away from manufacturing to service industries, which characterizes wealthy, growing economies. The latter are far less pollution-intensive than the former. But the former are necessary prerequisites for the latter. Property rights -- a necessary prerequisite for free market economies -- also provide strong incentives to invest in resource health. Without them, no one cares about future returns because no one can be sure they'll be around to reap the gains. Property rights are also important means by which private desires for resource conservation and preservation can be realized. When the government, on the other hand, holds a monopoly on such decisions, minority preferences in developing societies are overruled (see the old Soviet block for details). Furthermore, only wealthy societies can afford the investments necessary to secure basic environmental improvements, such as sewage treatment and electrification. Unsanitary water and the indoor air pollution (caused primarily by burning organic fuels in the home for heating and cooking needs) are directly responsible for about 10 million deaths a year in the Third World, making poverty the number one environmental killer on the planet today. Capitalism can save more lives threatened by environmental pollution than all the environmental organizations combined. Finally, the technological advances that are part and parcel of growing economies create more natural resources than they consume. That's because what is or is not a "natural resource" is dependent upon our ability to harness the resource in question for human benefit. Resources are therefore a function of human knowledge. Because the stock of human knowledge increases faster in free economies than it does in socialist economies, it should be no surprise that most natural resources in the western world are more abundant today than ever before no matter which measure one uses. This is not to say that government regulations haven't had an impact or aren't occasionally worthwhile. It is to say, however, that free markets are an ally -- not an enemy -- of Mother Earth. The Left, accordingly, has no special claim on Earth Day.

#### K doesn’t turn case – prefer our proximate internal links – they overdetermine war

Scott D. **Sagan** – Department of Political Science, Stanford University – ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE – **2000** – available via: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc

To make reasonable judgements in such matters **it is essential**, in my view, **to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination."**  Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war **and argue that the** likelihood of conflict was so high that the **war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off.**  If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors. The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. **During the** 1962 **Cuban Missile Crisis**, **a bizarre false warning** incident **in** the **U.S. radar systems** facing Cuba **led officers** at the North American Air Defense Command **to believe that** the U.S. was under attack and that **a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida.** Now **imagine** the counterfactual event that **this** false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and **resulted in** a U.S. nuclear **"retaliation**" against the Russians. **How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III?** **One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given** the **deep** political **hostility o**f the two superpowers, the ***conflicting ideology***, the escalating arms race, **nuclear war would have occurred eventually**. I**f not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin,** or the Middle East, or Korea. **From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.**

#### The judge must evaluate the consequences of the plan – ignoring the implications allows infinite violence

Williams 2005 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and **uncritical stances of abstract moralism** or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will**.** But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the **precondition for freedom**. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

#### Extinction first

Robin **Attfield**, Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, “The Ethics of the Global Environment”, Perdue University Press, 19**99**, pg 68

Nevertheless, as John Leslie has remarked, many **philosophers write as if there were no reason for preserving the human species** beyond obligations either to the dead or to the living, and some as if there would be nothing wrong with allowing the species to extinguish itself, or even with actively extinguishing it ourselves, well before this would happen in the ordinary course of events. Now **the argument** concerning the value of ongoing current activities already shows that the verdicts that there would be nothing wrong with **allowing** (let alone causing) **premature extinction are unsupportable**; for the prospect of premature human extinction deprives many (but not all) widespread current activities of their meaning and value. But, as has just been argued, there must be something else to explain the strength of the imperative not to allow or to make premature extinction come about, and to explain what it is that makes most people who contemplate the possibility of premature human extinction regard it as appalling. Cicero makes a parallel point: 'As we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.'23  Likewise the consequentialist ethic introduced and defended in Chapter 2 maintains that future people have moral standing (and future living creatures of other species too). **Future generations have this standing even though their existence is contingent on current generations and the identity of future individuals is unknown at present; the good or ill of individuals who could be brought into existence count as reasons for or against actions or policies which would bring them into being**. This in turn implies that where the existence beyond a certain date of individuals likely to lead happy, worthwhile or flourishing lives can be facilitated or prevented, there is an obligation not to prevent it, other things being equal. **This does not mean that everyone should be continually having children**; other things are seldom equal, and problems of human numbers mean that acting on this basis could easily produce overextended families, countries or regions, or an overpopulated planet, where extra people would spell misery for themselves and for the others (see Chapter 7). But it does mean that each life likely to be of positive quality comprises a reason for its own existence, and that countervailing reasons of matching strength (concerning the disvalue of adding this life) are required to neutralise such a reason.  There are many other implications, including the importance of planning for the needs of future generations (considered in later chapters). **A further implication, more relevant here, is that humanity should not be allowed to become extinct, insofar as this is within human control, even if,** foreseeably, a small minority of any **given generation will lead lives of negative quality** (lives which are either not positively worth living or actually worth not living), **as long as**, **overall, the lives of that generation are of positive quality**, and the positive intrinsic value of worthwhile lives outweighs the intrinsic disvalue of the lives of misery. Since each generation is highly likely to include some lives which are not worth living, however hard its members and their predecessors may try to raise the quality of these lives, this implication makes all the difference to the issue of whether causing or even allowing the extinction of humanity is a moral crime.  **People who think that preventing misery is always of the greatest importance have to take the view that human extinction should be tolerated or even advocated; but the consequentialist ethic defended here says otherwise**. So, of course, say the widespread intuitions reviewed earlier. A modified version of one of John Leslie's thought-experiments could be used to test much the same issue. On each of numerous inhabitable planets, capable of supporting a large human population, whose members would predictably lead lives of positive quality, there will also be a person whose life will predictably and inevitably be of negative quality. For the purposes of the thought-experiment, these large human populations can be brought into existence by waving a magic wand. Should this be done? For consequentialists who believe in optimising the balance of intrinsic value over intrinsic disvalue, and in counting every actual and possible life as having moral standing, the answer is affirmative, even though the resulting population of each planet includes a life of negative quality.  But **theorists who prioritise the prevention of misery would have to hold that** the answer depends entirely on whether the **life of negative quality** on each planet **can be prevented**; **if it cannot, then none of these lives should be engendered**. (Others too, including consequentialists, might also take this view if the addition of human lives were liable to harm the living creatures of these same planets; to make this thought-experiment a test case, we need to adopt the further assumption that no such harm would be done.)   This thought-experiment also has a bearing on human extinction. For the future of the Earth beyond a certain date (just after the death of the youngest person now alive) is in some ways similar to the situation of the planets just mentioned. The current generation could produce a population living then, most of them people with lives worth living, but only at the risk of producing a minority whose lives will foreseeably be miserable. If the happiness or the worthwhile lives of the majority do not count as reasons for generating those same lives, and hence nothing counts but the misery of the minority, or if the prevention of misery  should be prioritised over all else, then allowing extinction is clearly mandatory, and so may be even genocide. **However**, as Leslie claims, **the coexistence of hundreds of thousands of lives of positive quality with one life of misery is not morally disastrous, if the misery of the miserable life really cannot be alleviated**. 25 (If of course this misery could be alleviated, whether by contemporaries or by the previous generation, then this might well be a morally disastrous situation, and alleviation would almost certainly be obligatory.) Consequentialism, then, does not mandate extinction, unlike several of the theories which stand opposed to it.

### Anthro 2ac

#### 2. Perm do both – Earth is so over-run with human control that relinquishing anthropocentrism now wouldn’t solve – it would be impossible for nature to take its course – only pragmatism solves

**Katz ’99** (Eric, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Winter, Environmental Ethics, Vol 21, “A Pragmatic Reconsideration of Anthropocentrism,” jj)

What about the nonanthropocentric argument regarding beach replenishment? A nonanthropocentric argument, by definition, will not consider as primary the benefits that humans will obtain from a particular policy—so many of the reasons just listed cannot be considered. **From a perspective of nonanthropocentric ecological holism, we should let natural processes take their course for the good of the overall ecological community**. **If the beach erodes, the erosion is part of the normal natural dynamics of the shoreline ecosystem. Indeed, most of the sand is not lost to the system; it simply shifts its location**, for undeveloped and unprotected barrier islands have a tendency to move landward over the course of time. Sand moves from the ocean side of the island to the bay side. The movement and displacement of sand would result in the loss of houses, especially along the immediate ocean waterfront, but this loss would not be a negative impact for the natural ecosystem. In addition, letting the natural erosion process continue without interference might lead to the possible reemergence or resurgence of those species that have been harmed by human housing development along the shore—such as the piping plover and the least and roseate terns. Thus, **a nonanthropocentric perspective would lead to a policy in which the shoreline would continue to erode as sands naturally shift.** The beach would be “restored” in a sense to a more natural state. On first examination, thus, there is a clear pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. One position favors a policy of beach replenishment and the other does not. However, **there is a major complication to this analysis** that I want to consider. **The idea that we can let nature take its course in this case is problematic.** On my view, **the beaches** of Fire Island **are now an artifactual system, considerably modified by human development**—particularly bulkheading and jetties. Except for the wilderness areas, almost the entire north side of Fire Island is bulkheaded, with docks and artificially dredged harbors and boat slips. Thus, **the natural movement of sand by water currents has been disrupted** for about a hundred years, and indeed part of the erosion problem is caused by the fact that the sand, when it migrates to the bay side of the island, has no place to land—the bulkheading acts like a seawall and prevents the accumulation of sand dropped by the smaller estuarine waves of the Great South Bay. Sand migrating over the island by wind, waves, and tidal surges is also prevented from a natural buildup by the humanmade physical structures and human activity. (One of the common early spring chores is to sweep the winter’s accumulation of sand off the main sidewalks. But the sand’s movement to the north is relentless—the sidewalks have to be swept weekly during the summer months.) **Given the current state of development on the island it would be impossible to let nature take its course**; the island no longer has a natural configuration. (Of course, there would be one radical way to solve this problem: the park service could condemn all the private homes on the island, destroy them, and rip out all human-made physical structures. The economic cost of this plan would be astronomical, both in outof- pocket expenses and in the lost revenue from tourism and real-estate taxes.) Thus, if the beach is an artifactual system, the question to be asked changes: What is the pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism regarding the policy of beach replenishment for a nonnatural artifactual beach system? **The anthropocentric argument appears essentially to be the same as before. We still want to promote human interests by saving and preserving the beach— only now we recognize that it is not a natural beach, but an artifactual one**. We are still going to preserve the island for human benefits and human interests. We still want to protect the private homes and provide a recreational beach. We can even argue that the artifactual beach system is necessary to protect the relatively undisturbed wilderness area that lies on the landward side of the dunes. The anthropocentric argument thus does not change. However, **the nonanthropocentric ecological holistic argument is now largely irrelevant, for we are only dealing with an artifactual system**, or at best a hybrid of natural and artifactual. **Such a system is essentially human-based, so that human interests and concerns dominate any evaluation**. I have previously analyzed the difference between artifacts and natural entities—and I will not repeat arguments I have made in some detail in other places.23 I have argued that it is the presence of human intentionality in a natural system that irrevocably modifies nature and establishes an artifactual system. The introduction of human purpose is the key to understanding the difference between artifactual and natural systems. The reason why we create artifacts, why we interfere in natural processes, is to further human goals and interests. We tend to evaluate the worth of our artifacts and human-made systems by their success in achieving our human-centered aims. Thus, we will value the Fire Island system to the extent that it meets our aims and goals. **We cannot return** Fire Island **to a “natural” state**. **Thus, we cannot use what is beneficial to the overall ecological community as the sole guide to environmental decision-making. We must consider the satisfaction of human interests in the evaluation of** environmental **policies** on Fire Island. As an artifactual system—or as a hybrid of the natural and the artifactual—Fire Island must be evaluated from a perspective that includes anthropocentrism. Thus, Fire Island will have to be managed— perhaps preserved in terms of long-range sustainability—so that it best achieves the human goals that have been incorporated into its development. In this case, pragmatism as a methodology—as a means of testing theoretical ideas for their “cash-value” in terms of practical consequences—teaches us that a **simplistic reliance on theoretical concepts such as anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism will fail to address adequately the complexities of the policy situation.** Pragmatism endorses a vision beyond the facile dualisms of nonanthropocentrism and anthropocentrism, natural and artifactual. Without resorting to the substantive content of pragmatism as a moral philosophy, **we can see the need for flexibility, compromise, and a pluralism of values in the analysis of concrete environmental policy decisions. When dealing with a hybrid system of humanity and nature, we need to use all of the relevant theoretical concepts, crossing and recrossing the boundaries that separate anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism**. Pragmatism cannot, in the end, tell us how to effect the compromise; it cannot tell us what specific policies we should adopt in all situations. **Pragmatism** simply **reminds us to be open to a wide range of possibly relevant and meaningful values in the formation and justification of policy.**

#### Action and reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.

**Padrutt, 92** – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, *Heidegger and the Earth*, “Heidegger and Ecology,” ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

#### 4 Anthropocentrism is inevitable and good—the alternative links to the critique and makes it impossible to protect the biosphere.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values, or preferences seems to be a hopeless quest. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned to promote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimate part of such a flourishing.

The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade the quality of the planet's living systems. But these judgements are possible only if we assume a set of values (that is, preference rankings), based on human preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of human interests and concerns. What's wrong with shallow views is not their concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-being consists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception.

Our sort of world, with our sort of fellow occupants is an interesting and engaging place. There is every reason for us to try to keep it, and ourselves, going for a few more cosmic seconds [10].

#### 6 Their alternative means we all die—it makes extinction inevitable.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

Suppose that astronomers detect a modest asteroid or comet, say five or ten kilometres diameter, on collision course with planet Earth [8]. The impending collision would be perfectly natural all right, and cataclysmic enough to do to us what another one rather like it probably did to the dinosaurs. Such periodic disruptive events are natural all right, though they probably destroy most of the then extant large life forms. These times of renewal provide opportunities for smaller, flexible organisms to radiate opportunistically into vacated niches, and life goes on. From a biocentric or ecocentric perspective there is little doubt that our demise would provide comparable opportunities for development which we currently prevent. Should we, in <470> such circumstances, step aside so that evolution can continue on its majestic course? I think not, and I think further that interference with the natural course of events, if it could be effected, would be no bad thing—at least from our point of view and in terms of our interests, which it is quite legitimate to promote and favour.

Suppose again that we are entering one of the periodic epochs of reduced solar energy flux. An ice age is imminent, with massive disruptions to the agriculturally productive temperate zones. However suppose further that by carefully controlled emissions of greenhouse gases it would be possible to maintain a stable and productive agriculture. No doubt this would be to the detriment of various arctic plant and animal species, but I do not think that such interference, though "unnatural" would be therefore deplorable. Nature in and of itself is not, I suggest, something to be valued independently of human interests. It could be argued moreover that in thus modifying our natural environment, we would be following the precedent of three billion years of organic evolution, since according to the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock (1979), the atmosphere and oceans are not just biological products, but biological constructions.

#### 7. Their radical devotion to ecocentrism collapses into nihilism and paralysis.

Brown 95 — Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (“Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview,” *The Midwest Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 2, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Information Access)

Deep ecologists regularly urge us to replace our anthropocentrism with an ecocentrism which advocates egalitarian attitudes toward all entities and forms in nature. In this suggestion, too, there is both promise and peril. Its promise lies in the hope that we will be able to see ourselves as enjoying a solidarity with nature. This is an expression of the wholistic motif present in all forms of ecological thinking. The radical egalitarianism of ecocentrism will, however, collapse into nihilism if no distinctions of value are made. To claim that everything has an equal and intrinsic value to everything else is to value nothing above anything else. Due to my place in the evolutionary-ecological system I cannot value the life of a child in a ghetto tenement and the lives of a family of rats equally. To do so would be to abdicate all value and leave me unable to act. It is a part of the predicament of every species to act from its self interest and to choose to spare the life of any innocent person over the lives of a family of rats in an expression of this evolutionary imperative.

## Round 3 v Army BC

### Heg

#### Heg sustainable absent self inflicted wound

**Walt ’11** (Stephen, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, the National Interest, Nov/Dec, Iss. 116, p. 6-16 (11 pp.), “The End of the American Era” proquest, jj)

Don't get me wrong. **The United States is not finished** as a major power. **Nor is it destined to become just one of several equals in a future multipolar world**. To the contrary, **the United States still has the world's strongest military, and the U.S. economy remains diverse and technologically advanced**. **China's economy may soon be larger** in absolute terms, **but its per capita income will be far smaller, which means its government will have less surplus to devote to expanding its reach** (including of the military variety). **American expenditures on higher education and industrial research and development still dwarf those of other countries, the dollar remains the world's reserve currency and many states continue to clamor for U.S. protection**. Furthermore, **long-term projections of U.S. latent power are reassuring**. **Populations in Russia, Japan and most European countries are declining and aging, which will limit their economic potential in the decades ahead.** **China's median age is also rising rapidly** (an unintended consequence of the one-child policy), **and this will be a powerful drag on its economic vitality**. By contrast, **U.S. population growth is high compared with the rest of the developed world, and U.S. median age will be lower than any of the other serious players**. Indeed, **in some ways America's strategic position is actually more favorable than it used to be**, which is why its bloated military budget is something of a mystery. In 1986, for example, the United States and its allies controlled about 49 percent of global military expenditures while our various adversaries combined for some 42 percent. Today, **the United States and its allies are responsible for nearly 70 percent of military spending; all our adversaries put together total less than 1 5 percent**. Barring additional self-inflicted wounds, **the United States is not going to fall from the ranks of the great powers at any point in the next few decades.** Whether the future world is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, Washington is going to be one of those poles - and almost certainly the strongest of them.

#### Continued primacy is key to make the multipolar transition stable---abrupt withdrawal guarantees great power war.

**Bacevich**, August 17th, 20**11** (Andrew, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, Los Angeles Times, “Shaping a New World Order” [http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich-multipolar-world-20110817,0,6442079.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich-multipolar-world-20110817%2C0%2C6442079.story), jj)

That said**, there is much that the United States can and ought to do to ensure that this emerging multipolar world ends up being more or less stable**, and more or less decent, and therefore more or less congenial to the well-being of the American people. **Multipolarity implies complications. A little more than a century ago, mismanagement by the last multipolar order produced a world war, followed by the Depression and then another world war worse than the first. Avoiding a repetition of those serial catastrophes defines the overarching strategic imperative of our age.**

***All their turns are inevitable - Zero Chances of willful US restraint – we’ll inevitably be engaged globally – the only question is effectiveness***

**Shalmon and Horowitz ’09** (Dan, Senior Analyst at Lincoln Group, LLC., and a graduate student at Georgetown University, total badass, Mike, assistant professor of Political Science at The University of Pennsylvania, as well as an FPRI scholar, less of a badass, Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 2, ‘The Future of War and American Military Strategy”, Spring)

**It is important to recognize at the outset** two **key points about United** **States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C**. This could always change, of course. However, at present, **it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world.** Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

***Withdrawal won’t solve terrorism***

**Nye, February 2008**

Joseph S. Survival, “Recovering American Leadership”, http://www.informaworld.com/index/790435554.pdf

In light of these new circumstances, how will the only superpower guide its foreign policy after the experience of the Iraq war? Will it provide global leadership or conclude that the best course in world affairs is to remain uninvolved? Some Americans are tempted to believe that the United States could reduce its vulnerability if it withdrew its troops, curtailed its alliances and followed a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove the vulnerability. Even if Washington had a more inward-looking foreign policy, radical groups would resent the power of the American economy that would still reach well beyond its shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some. Moreover, American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what the government does. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood, CNN and the Internet. American films and television express freedom, individualism and change (as well as sex and violence). Generally, the global reach of American culture helps to enhance America’s soft power– individualism and liberties are attractive to many people. Some, however, are repulsed by these American values, particularly fundamentalists. Moreover, new problems like climate change and pandemics cross borders without the slightest regard to American culture or intentions. Turning inward does no good if the problems follow you home.

### AT: Ice Age

#### Link turn – warming leads to ice age

Calvin 98 – theoretical neurophysicist @ U of W

William H. Calvin, Theoretical Neurophysicist at the University of Washington in Seattle, "The great climate flip-flop," The Atlantic Monthly 281:47-64

There are a few obvious precursors to flushing failure. One is diminished wind chill, when winds aren't as strong as usual, or as cold, or as dry — as is the case in the Labrador Sea during the North Atlantic Oscillation. This El Niño-like shift in the atmospheric-circulation pattern over the North Atlantic, from the Azores to Greenland, often lasts a decade. At the same time that the Labrador Sea gets a lessening of the strong winds that aid salt sinking, Europe gets particularly cold winters. It's happening right now: a North Atlantic Oscillation started in 1996. Another precursor is more floating ice than usual, which reduces the amount of ocean surface exposed to the winds, in turn reducing evaporation. Retained heat eventually melts the ice, in a cycle that recurs about every five years. Yet another precursor, as Henry Stommel suggested in 1961, would be the addition of fresh water to the ocean surface, diluting the salt-heavy surface waters before they became unstable enough to start sinking. More rain falling in the northern oceans — exactly what is predicted as a result of global warming — could stop salt flushing. So could ice carried south out of the Arctic Ocean. There is also a great deal of unsalted water in Greenland's glaciers, just uphill from the major salt sinks. The last time an abrupt cooling occurred was in the midst of global warming. Many ice sheets had already half melted, dumping a lot of fresh water into the ocean. A brief, large flood of fresh water might nudge us toward an abrupt cooling even if the dilution were insignificant when averaged over time. The fjords of Greenland offer some dramatic examples of the possibilities for freshwater floods. Fjords are long, narrow canyons, little arms of the sea reaching many miles inland; they were carved by great glaciers when the sea level was lower. Greenland's east coast has a profusion of fjords between 70°N and 80°N, including one that is the world's biggest. If blocked by ice dams, fjords make perfect reservoirs for meltwater. Glaciers pushing out into the ocean usually break off in chunks. Whole sections of a glacier, lifted up by the tides, may snap off at the "hinge" and become icebergs. But sometimes a glacial surge will act like an avalanche that blocks a road, as happened when Alaska's Hubbard glacier surged into the Russell fjord in May of 1986. Its snout ran into the opposite side, blocking the fjord with an ice dam. Any meltwater coming in behind the dam stayed there. A lake formed, rising higher and higher — up to the height of an eight-story building. Eventually such ice dams break, with spectacular results. Once the dam is breached, the rushing waters erode an ever wider and deeper path. Thus the entire lake can empty quickly. Five months after the ice dam at the Russell fjord formed, it broke, dumping a cubic mile of fresh water in only twenty-four hours. The Great Salinity Anomaly, a pool of semi-salty water derived from about 500 times as much unsalted water as that released by Russell Lake, was tracked from 1968 to 1982 as it moved south from Greenland's east coast. In 1970 it arrived in the Labrador Sea, where it prevented the usual salt sinking. By 1971-1972 the semi-salty blob was off Newfoundland. It then crossed the Atlantic and passed near the Shetland Islands around 1976. From there it was carried northward by the warm Norwegian Current, whereupon some of it swung west again to arrive off Greenland's east coast — where it had started its inch-per-second journey. So freshwater blobs drift, sometimes causing major trouble, and Greenland floods thus have the potential to stop the enormous heat transfer that keeps the North Atlantic Current going strong.

### Elections 2ac

#### ---Race is tightening --- Ohio and PA are up for grabs --- Romney has momentum

TARANTO 9-27 JAMES TARANTO, Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2012, Is Pennsylvania in Play?, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578022450516310318.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>, jj

A pair of recent presidential polls by Voter Survey Service find an extremely close race in Pennsylvania, with President Obama leading Mitt Romney by just 48% to 47% and 47% to 45%. Pennsylvania hasn't voted Republican for president since 1988, and the closest margin since then was in 2004, when John Kerry, the haughty, French-looking Massachusetts Democrat who by the way served in Vietnam, beat George W. Bush by just 2.5%. If Pennsylvania is as close as VSS suggests, Obama will have a hard time winning re-election. A New York Times poll finds Obama leading Ohio by 53% to 43%. Ohio has voted for the presidential winner in every election of the past half-century, and Obama carried it by 4.6% in 2008. If he wins by 10 points, he ought to be re-elected in a landslide. Can both these polls be right? Probably not. There's no reason to think Ohio and Pennsylvania have wildly diverged in their politics since 2010, when Republicans won big in both states. If Ohio has moved back toward the Democrats, Pennsylvania almost certainly has too. If Obama is a prohibitive favorite in Ohio, it's vanishingly unlikely that Pennsylvania is in play--and vice versa. So what's going on here? "There appears to be a bimodal distribution of the polls," writes The Weekly Standard's Jay Cost. "All told, we see a statistically significant relationship between Obama's margin and the Democratic advantage in partisan identification. . . . They are not converging around a single point. Instead, some (notably Rasmussen, Purple Strategies, Survey USA, and Mason-Dixon) see Obama ahead by just 1 to 3 points in the key swing states, while others (notably the Washington Post, Fox News, PPP, and NBC News/Marist) see an Obama lead that ranges between 4 and 8 points. And the difference looks to be built around how many Democrats are included in the polling samples." Sure enough, in the Times poll, 35% of Ohio participants said they were Democrats, to just 26% Republicans. That's a difference of 9 points, wider than the 8-point gap in party ID that exit pollsters found in 2008. The Times poll also has Obama leading in Florida, 53% to 44%, and Pennsylvania, 54% to 42%. The party ID gap is 9 points in Florida and 11 points in Pennsylvania, up from 3 points and 7 points, respectively, in 2008. As VSS notes in the blog post defending its Pennsylvania poll, most other Keystone State surveys are closer to the Times poll than to its own. The Philadelphia Inquirer recently found Obama leading by 11%, and Muhlenberg College by 9%. Here's VSS's explanation: First, our ratio of interviews conducted with Republicans and Democrats in our recent polls (49D-43R) gives Democrats a 6-point advantage based on the fact that Democrats outnumber Republicans in actual registration. . . . Second, our ratio of younger to older voters reflects turnout that is likely to be slightly higher with older voters given the lack of enthusiasm from younger voters. . . . Third, recent polls showing a double-digit lead for Obama are not believable, and are probably using the 2008 voter turnout as the basis of their survey model. It is simply unrealistic to think Obama can or will win the Keystone State by the same double-digit margin he won by four years ago when you consider that most state and national polls continue to show most voters unhappy with the direction of the country after two straight years of unemployment at 8% or higher. Cost agrees: "If it comes down to whether or not this will be a repeat of 2008 . . . then my money is on no." There are other demographic peculiarities in some of these polls as well. At the Daily Caller, Brandon Gaylord of HorseRacePolitics.com looks at the Marist poll of five swing states (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio and Virginia) and finds that it is expecting a large drop-off in evangelical voters in four of them, and a large increase in voters making under $50,000 and decrease in those making over $100,000 in all five. (Higher-income voters tend to be more Republican). Gaylord's explanation: "I think the problem is that pollsters are so focused with ensuring that Democratic-leaning groups--especially minorities--are fairly represented in their polls that they're failing to ensure that Republican-leaning groups are also fairly represented in their polls." BattlegroundWatch.com makes a related point, noting that not only was minority turnout way up in 2008, but white turnout was down: Every voter turnout rate by race (relative to eligible population) was up versus 2004 except the white vote according to Pew Research. . . . Blacks were up +4.9%, Hispanics were up +2.7%, Asians were up +2.4%. But the percentage of White voters who showed up at the polls relative to who was eligible dropped -1.1% . . . This has nothing to do with minorities making up more or less of the electorate. This is simply saying from 2004 to 2008 White voter registration (which actually dropped 104k) and actual turnout of White voters (which increased 500k) did not keep up with voting age White population increases. Within this drop of White voter turnout, over 3x as many men as women comprised those voters staying home in the election. This happened for any number of reasons ranging from a disinterested national party to a disorganized Presidential campaign to a demoralized voting block [sic]–all are true. But the bottom line is one of the advantages Barack Obama enjoyed in 2008 was that a meaningful percentage of white voters simply stayed home in 2008.

#### Venezuelan civil war thumps Obama

Toro 9-27 Francisco Toro blogs about the Chávez Era at CaracasChronicles.com 9-27-12, The New Republic, How Hugo Chavez Could Help Mitt Romney Win the Election [http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107802/will-hugo-chavez-help-mitt-romney-win-the-election#](http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107802/will-hugo-chavez-help-mitt-romney-win-the-election), jj

With pundits rushing to file their Romney campaign obits ahead of the rush, the general consensus is that only a big time October surprise can save the GOP now. And while pundits generally look to the Middle East for likely sources of race-scrambling shocks, this year’s black swan could well fly in from the South, instead. By a quirk of fate, Venezuelans go to the polls to pick a president exactly 30 days before Americans do this year. Fourteen years into his term of office, an ailing Hugo Chávez faces his most competitive race yet, against an opposition united behind Henrique Capriles, a popular young state governor running a lean, focused campaign. Though Venezuelan polling is all over the place, some of the better ones now show a very close race, and the momentum is unmistakably on Capriles’ side. But that begs the question, would Hugo Chávez go quietly? There are good reasons to think he wouldn’t. Obsessed with countering a European-style “color revolution” Chávez has gone to elaborate extremes to give himself options in case he loses the election. A close Iranian ally, Chávez has stuck by the Bashar al Assad regime through thick and thin over the last 18 months supplying diesel and diplomatic cover and seeming to relish its capacity to resist democratic mobilization. As this Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Planning Memo stresses Chávez has created a well-armed civilian militia that operates outside the formal military chain of command, and answering only to him. Some observers are convinced it’s patterned explicitly Iran’s Basij militia whose success in putting down the Green Movement of 2009 Chávez unquestionably admires. Chillingly, he’s explicitly warned of civil war on more than one occasion should the opposition threaten his hold on power. Were this happening anywhere else in Latin America, U.S. pols could be foregiven for sleeping through it. But Venezuela remains a major oil exporter and the fourth largest supplier of foreign oil to the U.S. behind only Saudi Arabia and its Northern and Southern Neighbors. A spasm of violence and instability following a Chávez defeat would have immediate repercussions on world oil markets, and such shocks make themselves felt in U.S. swing voters’ pocketbooks immediately and painfully, through a mechanism that conveniently doubles as a G.O.P. talking point: the gas pump. With just six weeks to go, Mitt Romney needs a miracle to turn around a failing campaign. Hugo Chávez might be about to hand him one on a plate.

####  ( ) Plan swings blue collar voters to Obama --- they’re key to the election

Mead ‘12

Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 6-6, the American Interest, Green Politics Hurting Obama in Swing States <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/06/06/green-politics-hurting-obama-in-swing-states/>, jj

Since the beginning of the recession, America’s “brown jobs” revolution has been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise shaky recovery. States like North Dakota and Texas have led the country in growth due to their strong energy sectors, and the discovery of vast quantities of shale gas in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Colorado are now providing new jobs. These states have more than shale gas in common: all of them are also on the short list of swing states that decide this year’s presidential election. Republicans are seizing the opportunity to make energy politics a centerpiece of their campaign. As the FT reports: “Blue-collar voters were never that sold on environmental issues, and if some Democrats come across as not keen on economic development, it could lose them support here in Ohio,” he said. Republicans, from Mitt Romney, the party’s presidential candidate, to the congressional leadership, have made Barack Obama’s alleged stifling of the energy industry a centrepiece of their campaigns this year. . . . Mr Romney has said he will approve the Keystone XL pipeline as soon as he wins office and curb the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency. Only time will tell whether this is a winning strategy, but there is reason to think it could work. As we’ve mentioned before, energy politics is an area where Obama is particularly vulnerable. His decision to nix the popular Keystone pipeline earlier this year signaled antipathy toward one of America’s strongest industries while doing nothing to help the environment; it was lambasted as a pointless blunder by observers on both sides of the aisle. Meanwhile, his pet projects in alternative energy have fallen flat, as debacles like Solyndra have received far more attention than the program’s few successes. This should be seriously worrying to the Obama campaign. Brown jobs may be unpopular in Obama’s white-collar, urban, coastal base, but it is blue collar voters in swing states that are likely to decide the election, and many of these voters stand to reap significant benefits from an expansion of America’s energy sector. From a political perspective, Obama has placed himself on the wrong side of this issue. It may come back to bite him come November.

#### ( ) Plan’s key to Ohio and PA which determine the winner

Voters there care more about economic benefits than environmental costs

Plan means Romney can’t attack Obama’s regs as being “job killers”

O’Neill ‘12

Lauren O'Neil, Washington, Natural Gas Week, May 28, 2012, Shale Gas Policy Could Factor in Ohio, Pennsylvania Swing Votes, Lexis, jj

The positions of the US presidential candidates on federal regulation of shale gas may now be a top electoral issue for voters in Ohio and Pennsylvania, two "swing" states that are now the headquarters to booming activity in the Marcellus and Utica plays. Both the Romney and Obama campaigns will need to show the electorate they support natural gas development, but the devil is in the details. A recent poll conducted by Connecticut-based Quinnipiac University, for example, found that 64% of likely Ohio voters think the economic benefits of natural gas in Ohio outweigh the environmental consequences of drilling, compared to 29% who said the opposite. In fact, natural gas is polling as the most widely accepted energy priority for all Americans, more so than renewables or other fossil fuels ( NGW Apr.30'12 ). The Romney campaign may try to portray the US ***E***nvironmental ***P***rotection ***A***gency***'s*** regulations as job killers for Pennsylvania and Ohio, as the campaign has done with other EPA initiatives to regulate greenhouse gases. The Obama campaign will need to convince voters that the incumbent administration is also supportive of shale development, but try to justify the administration's regulatory proposals by appealing to Ohioans and Pennsylvanians who may want government standards to help keep the air and water clean in their communities. The federal government only controls small slices of Appalachian land under the US Forest Service. But EPA regulations on the gas industry would apply to all types of land -- federal, state and private. The agency is banned from regulating natural gas under the Safe Drinking Water Act, but under Obama, it has been proposing regulations on the air emissions and wastewater associated with hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" for well stimulation. Kevin Book, policy analyst with Clearview Energy Partners in Washington, said the need for the candidates to win the natural gas argument is already making a difference in the Obama administration's regulatory approach. For example, the EPA recently toned down its proposal to require green completions to cut back on fugitive emissions from upstream gas activity. Its final rule, released this spring, included exemptions for some wells and a phased-in approach -- industry-friendly measures that were not included in the proposed rule released last summer. "The renewed leniency the federal government is showing on air and water standards is an outgrowth of a combination of pragmatism and political necessity," Book told <em>Natural Gas Week</em>. He said the Obama campaign in particular will be walking a tightrope because the administration needs to take a stance on LNG export proposals this summer and fall -- a question that has divided gas producers, who want the option to export some gas, and manufacturers, who want to see gas prices stay low. Delaying these decisions may be hard to justify because the agencies in charging of reviewing LNG exports are usually held to strict time frames for giving answers to applicants. Ohio and Pennsylvania are considered among the three biggest battleground states in presidential elections, along with Florida. Other swing states include North Carolina, Virginia and Colorado, which all lean Republican but only slightly. Ohio is more of a swing state than Pennsylvania. Ohio's electoral votes went to the Democratic presidential nominee in 1996 and 2008 but to the Republican candidate in 2000 and 2004. Pennsylvania's electoral votes, on the other hand, have favored the Democratic candidate ever since 1992, though it is still considered a swing state due to divided electoral opinion polls and ongoing Republican wins in the state's legislative and gubernatorial races. With the economy and employment positioned to the top issue in this race, it will be key for the Obama and Romney campaigns to connect their support for natural gas development with the broader economy -- in terms of the industry's potential to create more revenue for existing businesses or attract new facilities like Shell Chemical's plans to place a multibillion-dollar ethane cracker in Pennsylvania ( NGW Mar.19'12 ).

#### ( ) No link --- base enthusiasm inevitable

Cillizza 9-20

Chris Cillizza, 9-20-12, Washington Post, The enthusiasm gap (or not) — in 2 charts <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/09/20/the-enthusiasm-gap-or-not-in-2-charts/>, jj

Clearly Democrats have grown more enthusiastic about voting since this summer — the almost-certain result of the party’s successful national convention earlier this month. It is also true that among the likeliest of the likely voters Romney retains a slight edge over Obama due to the fact that the people trying to win something back are almost always more fired up to do it than the people who are just trying to hold on to what they have. (Sidebar: That same phenomenon is why it’s so hard to repeat as champions in a sport.) Focusing on the relative enthusiasm of the two party bases may well be something of a moot point in the end. It’s hard to imagine that in a presidential election where so much money has been spent on both sides and so much vitriol has been slung (if you can sling vitriol, that is) that the bases of both parties won’t be wildly fired up to vote.

#### ( ) Only a risk of the turn --- independents decide the election

Angle ‘12

Jim Angle, 7-27-12, Fox News, Political parties turn to independent voters for edge in November

<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/26/political-parties-turn-to-independent-voters-for-edge-in-november/#ixzz23YpM5gQD>, jj

Most registered Republicans and Democrats have long since made up their minds who they're going to vote for, so the presidential campaigns are poised to spend tens of millions of dollars trying to win over those who say they don't belong to either party. "Most folks in the parties have made their decision already," says Lanae Erickson Hatalsky of the centrist Democratic think tank Third Way. "And so those independents, a bigger number of them, are now going to be the real key to victory in 2012." David Winston, a Republican strategist, said such independents made up 22 percent of voters in 2002. "In 2010, they had grown to make up about 29 percent of the electorate," he said. "So clearly as the exit polls have shown, they've grown quite a bit." And a Gallup poll recently reported that independents account for 35 percent or more of voters in most recent elections. Some political analysts, however, say many voters call themselves independents but really are not -- that the true number is less than 10 percent. If so, they're just as important: "Even half of that means 3, 4, 5 percent, and in most of these battleground states the final results will be within 52 to 48 percent, so they could be and probably will be the critical voters," says Larry Sabato, a political analyst at the University of Virginia. And one Republican analyst says independents have been key in recent swings of power in Washington. "In 1994, when Republicans won the Congress, we won independents by 14 (percentage points)," Winston said. "In 2006, when we lost the Congress, we lost independent by 18. And we came back in this last election in 2010, we won independents by 19 points"

***Russian energy manipulation enables global anti-American expansionism***

**Cohen ‘07**

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Europe's Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy”, 11-5-07, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm

From the American perspective, growing Euro­pean dependence on energy from and infrastructure owned by Russia is a **negative geopolitical trend**. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to use energy **as a political tool.** Russia's assertive **Cold War–like posture** is a growing concern for Washington.

It is in the U.S. strategic interest to mitigate Europe's dependence on Russian energy. The Krem­lin will likely use Europe's dependence to promote its largely **anti-American foreign policy agenda**. This would significantly **limit the maneuvering space available to America's European allies**, forcing them to choose between an affordable and stable energy supply and siding with the U.S. on some key issues.

***That causes global nuclear war***

**Blank 9** – Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. **Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives**. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,

But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

#### Romney won’t hurt relations --- too resilient

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government, 3-30-12, World Politics Review, The Realist Prism: Global Leaders Left Guessing Who the 'Real' U.S. President Will Be in 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11789/the-realist-prism-global-leaders-left-guessing-who-the-real-u-s-president-will-be-in-2013>, jj

The dilemma faced by Putin, and many other world leaders, is to decide who they would rather do business with. Obama’s relationship with Putin got off to a frosty start when Obama visited Moscow in 2009. And no matter how badly Obama may want to salvage what he can of the reset, the camaraderie he developed with Medvedev will not be duplicated once Putin is back in the presidential chair. Meanwhile, Romney has taken a sharply anti-Russian line, particularly in recent days, identifying Russia as the premier geopolitical threat to the United States. But it bears noting that as a candidate, George W. Bush expressed similar skepticism on Russia before developing a close personal connection with Putin after the Ljubljana summit in the summer of 2001.

#### Relations inevitable – desire for prestige

Shoumikhin et. al. 2009 (Andrei Shoumikhin, Ph.D., is Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.” Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for the Protect and Defend Strategy,” 5-4, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2266.cfm>)

Strategic relations between the United States and the Russian Federation are of paramount impor­tance for the Russian leadership, just as they were for Soviet leaders.[[17]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn17%22%20%5Co%20%22) From Moscow's perspective, they symbolize the equivalence of the geostrategic potentials of the two powers that have the largest nuclear arsenals. As former Russian President and current Prime Minister Putin has noted: Russia and the United States are the biggest nuclear powers. Our economy might be smaller, but Russia's nuclear potential is still comparable to that of the United States.… It is also important that we have the years of experience, the technology and the production potential, the technological chains and the specialists. Russia is a great nuclear power. No one disputes or doubts this. And the United States and Russia definitely have a shared interest in ensuring security on this planet.[[18]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn18%22%20%5Co%20%22) After the loss of the former Soviet Union's super­power status, Russia has worked diligently to rees­tablish its influence in Eurasia, the Middle East, and even Latin America. While this lost status hurts the Russian pride, it also allows Moscow to blame the U.S. for any problems in international relations. On behalf of Russia, Putin officially asserted that "the stagnation in disarmament…has not come about through any fault of ours."[[19]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn19) At the same time, Rus­sian leaders have never missed an opportunity to praise the virtue of and their adherence to the remaining regimes and treaties. This is not because of some abstract devotion to so-called international legality[[20]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn20) or infinite trust in treaty obligations, but because these treaties were usually seen as an effec­tive way of preventing the U.S. and other powers from gaining superiority over Russia in advanced weapon systems. In fact, Moscow has demonstrated its readiness to abandon treaty obligations that fail to serve Russian interests.[[21]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn21)

#### US-Russia relations don’t solve global problems

Ostapenko ‘09 (E., Trend Daily News, Turkish Weekly, “Normalization In U.s.-russian Relations Not To Change Political Situation In World: Analyst At French Studies Institute” 7-8, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/83734/-normalization-in-u-s-russian-relations-not-to-change-political-situation-in-world-analyst-at-french-studies-institute-.html)

Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance and will not change the situation in the world, since today Russia does not play the role it played formerly, Dominic Moisi, analyst on Russian-American relations, said. "There is a country that is essential for the future of the world, it is not Russia, but it is China," Moisi, founder and senior advisor at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), told [Trend News](http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/83734/%22http%3A/news.trend.az%22) in a telephone conversation from Paris Speaking of the growing role of China, Moisi said that the Chinese are soon going to be the number two economy in the world. Russian economy can not compete. As another important aspect of the increasing weight of China in the world, Moisi considers the absence of problems with the aging of population, unlike European countries, including Russia.

### CP – ban energy subsidies

#### Bridge fuels key --- renewables can’t come close to displacing fossil fuels in the near term

**Tour et al. ‘10**

James M. Tour, Carter Kittrell and Vicki L. Colvin are in the Department of Chemistry, Department of Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science, and the Green Carbon Center, Rice University. Nature Materials 9,871–874(2010), Green carbon as a bridge to renewable energy, <http://www.nature.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/nmat/journal/v9/n11/full/nmat2887.html>, jj

A green use of carbon-based resources that minimizes the environmental impact of carbon fuels could allow a smooth transition from fossil fuels to a sustainable energy economy. Carbon-based resources (coal, natural gas and oil) give us most of the world's energy today, but the energy economy of the future must necessarily be far more diverse. Energy generation through solar, wind and geothermal means is developing now, but not fast enough to meet our expanding global energy needs. We advocate that 'green carbon', which enables us to use carbon-based sources with high efficiency and in an environmentally friendly manner, will provide our society time to develop alternative energy technologies and markets without sacrificing environmental or economic quality. Green carbon will help to reduce the loss of our precious carbon resources, which are better reserved for high-value chemicals, and it will ensure that those hydrocarbons used for fuels will minimize carbon emissions. Through intensive research and development in green carbon, our society can guarantee an energy future that uses carbon strategically, without smokestacks, greenhouse gases and extensive environmental damage. Building a solid bridge There is a chasm between the diminutive proportions of renewable energy currently available and our overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels that currently propel society. The energy policy review of the Obama administration makes this soberingly clear: “The use of renewable energy today and even in the next 5 to 10 years is still extremely limited when put into the context of total world use of fossil fuels. For example, the world used the equivalent of 113,900 terawatts hours [TWh] of fossil energy to fuel economic activity, human mobility, and global telecommunications, among other modern day activities in 2007. Replacing those terawatts hours with non-fossil energy would be the equivalent of constructing an extra 6,020 nuclear plants across the globe or 14 times the number of nuclear power plants in the world today. In renewable energy terms, it is 133 times the amount of solar, wind and geothermal energy currently in use on the planet.”1 Barring a huge reduction in our global standard of living, we will need to rely on carbon-based energy for some time. Whether this will last for several decades or into the next century is unclear, but what is apparent is that renewable approaches to energy generation are increasing at an annual rate of 7.2% compared with 1.6% for non-renewable growth2, and the continued growth of renewables will demand sustained government support. During this transition we propose a green carbon bridge that minimizes the environmental impact of carbon fuels and lowers our reliance on these resources for primary energy generation. Ultimately, green carbon will use hydrogen from renewable sources, while at the same time producing basic chemical feedstocks.

#### 3) Turn --- natural gas key to renewables transition

**Frank et al ‘09**

Matthew Frank, Jenna Goodward, Sarah Ladislaw, and Kate Zyla, May 2009, CSIS, Crossing the Natural Gas Bridge, <http://csis.org/files/publication/090626_final_crossing_gas_bridge.pdf>, jj

Addressing climate change will require extensive changes in the ways that we produce, transport and use energy. Given the scope, scale and complexity of the current energy system, the transition to a low carbon energy future will take time, significant investment and carefully crafted polices. During the transition, it is important for policymakers and the private sector to balance the need for aggressive action to reduce emissions with the need for reliable and affordable energy supplies. Natural gas can play a critical role in “building a bridge” to a secure, low-carbon energy system. It is the least carbon intensive fossil fuel (burning gas emits less carbon dioxide than burning coal or oil), and there are readily available supplies, both within and outside of the United States. New natural gas power generation facilities can be brought online quickly compared to other low-carbon sources such as nuclear power. They also enable more renewable energy by providing baseload power generation to complement the intermittent nature of renewables like wind and solar power. There is already a great deal of existing infrastructure –from electric power plants and home furnaces to pipelines and ports – that is able to store, transport, and use natural gas.

#### The judge must evaluate the consequences of the plan – ignoring the implications allows infinite violence

Williams 2005 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and **uncritical stances of abstract moralism** or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will**.** But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the **precondition for freedom**. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

### K 2ac – Schmidt

#### And, no prior questions --- elevating ontological and philosophical concerns fails and trades off with pragmatic policy solutions

Jenkins ‘11

Willis Jenkins, Margaret A. Farley Assistant Professor of Social Ethics, Professor Jenkins teaches environmental ethics, global ethics, and Christian social thought. He is author of Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology, which won a 2009 Templeton Award for Theological Promise, and Sustainability, Social Justice, and Christian Ethics (Georgetown, in press). He is editor of The Spirit of Sustainability (2009) and coeditor of Bonhoeffer and King: Their Legacies and Import for Christian Social Thought (2010). He has written recent journal articles on ethics in the environmental sciences, on homelessness and urban theory, and on the field of religion and ecology.

Ethics & the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, AND CULTURAL REFORM, Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp.

51-74 (Article) PROJECT MUSE, jj

Pragmatism: Making Ethics Practical

Pragmatists often introduce their strategy of practical reason with an opening complaint that cosmological strategies of environmental ethics have not proven their practical worth. That complaint about effectiveness introduces a pragmatic proposal for less metaphysical debate and more attention to creating broad agreement on policy responses to practical problems. The editors of the anthology Environmental Pragmatism thus set the scene: On the one hand, the discipline…has produced a wide variety of positions and theories in an attempt to derive morally justifiable and adequate environmental policies. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what practical effect the field of environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy. (Light and Katz 1995, 1) Ben Minteer and Robert Manning blame the field’s ineffectiveness on its cosmological innovations: “urgent calls for new environmental worldviews and radically revised ontological schemes, rather than leading to improved environmental solutions and conditions, only lead ethicists’ attention away from the resources already present within our shared moral and political traditions.” In consequence, the field exhibits a “conspicuous silence regarding concrete solutions to real world environmental dilemmas” (2003, 319). Minteer and Manning follow the problem-solving approach opened by Bryan Norton, who contrasts his authentically “practical philosophy” with “axiological” value theories that, in his view, have narrowed topics of discussion, reduced possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration, and led to a communicative breakdown between science and society (2003, 47–63). For Norton, sustainability depends on an integrative, adaptive ethos developed from science-based responses to specific problems (2005). Pragmatists thus present their ethic of contextual problem-solving by pressing the dilemma between radical cosmological change and practical political engagement. Pragmatists expect environmental ethics to be practical in two ways: (1) by working with available moral resources, (2) for the sake of resolving specific policy problems. With both elements working together, they say, ethics can help achieve effective social response to environmental problems. Andrew Light thus asks ethicists to attend to cultural contexts by trying to “work within traditional moral psychologies and ethical theories that people already have” in order to create links between existing moral priorities in specific communities and the ends of environmental concern (2003, 235). Practical ethics requires, he says, a “practical anthropology,” attentive to the environmental interests and commitments that people hold, with a view toward “generating creative ways to persuade a variety of people” to adopt environmental solutions (2003, 241).

#### 2. Perm – do both - The plan over comes apocalyptic fear -- coupling our rhetoric with a solution solves

Feinberg and Willer 11 - Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley (Matthew and Robb, "Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs", Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)//KL

These results demonstrate how dire messages warning of the severity of global warming and its presumed dangers can backfire, paradoxically increasing skepticism about global warming by contradicting individuals’ deeply held beliefs that the world is fundamentally just. In addition, we found evidence that this dire messaging led to reduced intentions among participants to reduce their carbon footprint – an effect driven by their increased global warming skepticism. Our results imply that because dire messaging regarding global warming is at odds with the strongly established cognition that the world is fair and stable, people may dismiss the factual content of messages that emphasize global warming’s dire consequences. But if the same messages are delivered coupled with a potential solution, it allows the information to be communicated without creating substantial threat to these individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Our findings extend past research showing that fear-based appeals, especially when not coupled with a clear solution, can backfire and undermine the intended effects of messages (Witte, 1992; 1994). In addition, our results complement recent research showing that framing environmentalism as patriotic can successfully increase proenvironmental behavioral intentions in those most attached to the status quo (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Taken together, these findings stress the importance of framing global warming messages so they do not contradict individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Additionally, our results suggest that reducing individuals’ just world beliefs could result in decreased global warming skepticism. Although we were able to manipulate such beliefs in Study 2, it remains to be seen how just world beliefs could be

changed longer-term in field settings.

#### 3. Prefer the aff’s incrementalism to the alt’s inaction --- refusal to embrace bridge fuels like the aff guarantees environmental collapse

Charles K. **Ebinger**, Director, Energy Security Initiative Govinda Avasarala, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative The Brookings Institution 4-22-**10**, Environmental Pragmatism <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0422_environmental_pragmatism_ebinger.aspx>, jj

Finally, **people need to embrace pragmatism**. **Though it is not ideal and rarely a sexy declaration, pragmatism and incrementalism are** the **obligatory** taxes of multilateral agreements (mind you, they are less obtrusive with fewer parties). **There are many tools at our disposal that can put the stalled climate change efforts into first gear**. First, **we must embrace bridge technologies, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and state of the art cleaner coal**. **With total global renewable energy capacity falling catastrophically short of global energy demand, ‘bridge’ technologies can ease the environmental strain while we wait for renewable capacity to reach requisite levels**. In addition, investments in upgrading many nations’ electricity grids will make a remarkable difference in the environmental impact of power generation. **The need for action to reduce climate change is very real, particularly as many emerging economies and failed and near-failed states are most at risk and can potentially spur widespread global unrest**. **Clinging to an inefficient, incapable system will only exacerbate the crisis of inaction at a time where the world can ill-afford it. By focusing on smaller negotiations** with actual large emitters, garnering a better understanding of the real economics behind climate change, **and embracing smaller steps in ‘bridge’ technologies, we can do a far more effective job of getting the ball rolling.**

#### 4. Rejection of current IR paradigm leads to instability and international intervention – turns their impact

**McCormack 10** – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. **Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks**. **In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before.  **Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world**. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. **Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security**, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts **are highly problematic and unprogressive.** For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan.  Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security.  For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without  causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony.  Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. **We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.**

#### 5. Predictions are methodologically sound, reflexive, and increasingly accurate.

Ruud **van der Helm** is a Dutch policy officer on instrument development in the Aid Effectiveness and Policy Department. Futures – Volume 41, Issue 2, Pages 67-116 (March **2009**) – obtained via Science Direct

Futurists build and discuss statements on future states of affairs. When their work is challenged, they cannot defend ‘‘what may come to be’’ with robust forms of proof. They have no direct observation, can design no experiments, and cannot accumulate data sets. All the work, all the discussions of validity, have to rely on indirect reasoning based on current and past observations, experiments and data. Such reasoning is fragile and subject to considerable uncertainty. Ever since the field emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, futurists have been acutely aware of the special challenge this implies, including two most obvious consequences. First, even the most serious work is vulnerable to potentially devastating criticism. This has triggered an on-going effort of theoretical justification that has accompanied the development of the Futures field. Second, in relation to this, sound methodology is crucially important to provide support when exploring such insecure ground as professional and academic speculation on possible futures. It is not surprising that methodology has constantly been one – and often the – central concern of the field, sometimes to a point of excess. As early as 1980, De´coufle´ could warn companion futurists against the urge ‘‘to jump steps in the long and difficult progression towards the still hypothetical scientificity of conjectural work by displaying inappropriate complacency for issues of method’’. Whether or not some futurists do ‘jump steps’, the Futures field has consistently shown much reflexivity on its theoretical foundations and its methodological procedures. However, the nature of the theoretical and methodological challenges to be addressed by such reflexivity changes over time. The doctrines, the methodological resources, the knowledge-base, the organisation of discussion in the field, that once provided the basis for successfully meeting the challenges of a given era may become inadequate or irrelevant if the context comes to change in a major way. Our argument in this special issue is that such a major change in the challenges that have to be met by our field is now well under way, calling for a major re-examination and renewal of the theoretical underpinnings of futures work.1 Deepening and refining the diagnosis of the changing context of FS is of course one part of the task ahead of us. But to launch the effort, and show its necessity, let us just sketch a rough picture of the situation, by reviewing three important aspects of the development of the Futures field: (1) practical necessity and finalisation, (2) peculiarity and separation, and (3) methodology-based development. Confronted with strident criticism on the possibility and legitimacy of any serious study of future situations, the strongest argument put forward by many pioneers of the Futures field was that studying possible futures was necessary for action and decision-making. As expressed by Bertrand de Jouvenel (1964): ‘‘One always foresees, without richness of data, without awareness of method, without critique nor cooperation. It is now urgent and important to give this individual and natural activity a cooperative, organised character, and submit it to growing demands of intellectual rigor’’. This has proved a decisive basis for the development of the field, fromthe1960s to thep resent day. It has led to a situation where most works on futures are legitimised through their connection to business management, to public decision-making, or both. The success of foresight in the recent years is an illustration of the strength of this covenant between futures methodology and the needs of long-term, strategic, management and policy. The downside of thus using the contribution to decision-making as the main theoretical justification and as the backbone of methodological design in futures work has been, and is now, a constant weakening of the effort to explore and develop other bases for theoretical foundation and methodological development. Although many such avenues have been opened, they have not been explored very far, because the evaluation of new methods has been based on their adequacy in serving studies designed for the preparation of decision-making, or of collective action.

#### 6. Act to save the most lives – imperfect knowledge doesn’t justify inaction

**Cowen ‘04** (Tyler, Professor of Economics – George Mason University, “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism”, 11-2, <http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf>, p. 14-15)

**The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances.** This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. The critique may give the impression of relying more heavily on a more plausible assumption, namely a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. **But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument**. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. **Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack** and one million children have contracted smallpox. We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. **If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works**. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. **Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other.** That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. **Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible**. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. **We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.”** Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. **We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive**. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of three to six hundred thousand children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important. **We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected the cure the greater number of children.**  **This example** may appear excessively simple, but it **points our attention to the non-generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.**

## Round 6 v JMU BM

### A2: glut

***Glut is temporary and won’t stop production***

**Daily Finance ‘12**

6-7, Why This Natural Gas Glut Will End <http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/06/07/why-this-natural-gas-glut-will-end/>, jj

**The U.S. is currently in the midst of a glut of *n*atural *g*as** and related products, and as a result, prices recently fell to around multi-decade lows. As wonderful as that is to those of us who use the fuel to heat our homes or cook our food, **it's a condition that can't last forever.** Like anything else in the market, **natural gas is subject to the law of supply and demand**, and its price sends signals to both producers and consumers on what to do next. **Low prices both encourage consumption and discourage new production, and that combination means that at some point**, probably within the next few years, **this glut will end**. The potential for decreasing supply **On the supply side, major natural gas drillers** like ExxonMobil (NYS: XOM) and Encana (NYS: ECA) recently **announced that they were scaling back production because of those low prices. That's to be expected**; after all, it costs them money to produce the gas, and if they're not earning a sufficient return on their investment, they'll deploy that cash elsewhere. ***That doesn't mean that supply grinds to a halt just because prices are low***. Indeed, **there are valid reasons to produce, even at today's incredibly low market prices**. For instance, Ultra Petroleum (NYS: UPL) has hedges for 2012 on over 150 billion cubic feet of gas, guaranteeing them $4.32 per million BTU on that production. Additionally, **many leases for gas drilling have "use it or lose it" clauses, where the company needs to do at least some drilling to keep its access to the property with the gas under it** Also, **there's an element of seasonality at work**. As the chart of natural gas in storage below indicates, **there's typically a buildup of supplies in storage over the summer months and a draw down over the winter as the fuel is used for heating**. To some extent, **producers may be pumping gas out of the ground that's not necessarily economical now, but may well be if prices recover during the winter drawdown.**

### A2: fracking bad- methane

***NG still better despite methane***

L. M. **Cathles**, June 6, 20**12**

After receiving his PhD from Princeton, Professor Larry Cathles joined Kennecott Copper Corporation where he investigated the genesis of porphyry copper deposits and industrial leaching processes. In 1978 he joined the faculty at Pennsylvania State University where his research focus was on the formation of massive sulfide deposits at mid-ocean ridges and in failed rifts in Japan. In 1982 he joined the Chevron Oil Field Research Laboratory where he developed genetic and exploration models for gold and sulfide deposits and investigated the C02 generation that often attends steam injection for enhanced oil recovery. In 1987 Cathles came to Cornell as an earth scientist who addresses the Earth processes with the perspective of a physicist. His fundamental approach is to construct physical process models that predict chemical change; to develop models that simulate the chemical alteration caused by the movements of water in the subsurface for example. Cathles has published over 110 peer-reviewed publications and a book: "The Viscosity of the Earth`s Mantle". Presently he is a co-leader of the oil and gas thrust of the Cornell KAUST program and Director of the Cornell Institute for the Study of the Continents.

Assessing the greenhouse impact of natural gas

<http://www.geo.cornell.edu/eas/PeoplePlaces/Faculty/cathles/Natural%20Gas/Assessing%20the%20greenhouse%20impact%20of%20natural%20gas%20FINAL%20UNFORMTTED.pdf>

The global warming impact of substituting natural gas for coal and oil is currently in debate. We address this question here by comparing the reduction of greenhouse warming that would result from substituting gas for coal and some oil to the reduction which could be achieved by instead substituting zero carbon energy sources. We show that **substitution** **of natural gas reduces global warming by 40%** of that which could be attained by the substitution of zero carbon energy sources. At **methane leakage rates that are ~1% of production**, which is similar to today’s probable leakage rate of ~1.5% of production, the 40% benefit is realized as gas substitution occurs. For short transitions the leakage rate must be more than 10 to 15% of production for gas substitution not to reduce warming, and for longer transitions the leakage must be much greater. But **even if the leakage was so high** that the substitution was not of immediate benefit, **the 40%**‐of‐zero‐carbon **benefit would be realized shortly after methane emissions ceased because methane is removed quickly from the atmosphere whereas CO2 is not**. The benefits of substitution are unaffected by heat exchange to the ocean. **CO2 emissions are the key to anthropogenic climate change, and substituting gas reduces them by 40%** of that possible by conversion to zero carbon energy sources. Gas substitution also reduces the rate at which zero carbon energy sources must be eventually introduced.

***Fracking regulations cause a shift towards methane hydrate extraction***

**Rennie ‘11**

John Rennie served as editor in chief of Scientific American between 1994 and 2009. Based in New York, he continues to work as a science writer and editor, and as an adjunct instructor in New York University's Science, Health and Environmental Reporting Program.

June 1, 2011, PLOS, Energy from Methane Hydrates: Better to Burn Out than Fade Away, <http://blogs.plos.org/retort/2011/06/01/energy-from-methane-hydrates-better-to-burn-out-than-fade-away/>, jj

But of course, in the real world, **a capability to use methane hydrates as a source of natural gas won’t matter unless it can do so cost-competitively**. **And right now, gas companies** and politicians **are most keenly excited about** the relatively new prospect of using horizontal drilling and controversial “**fracking**” techniques to capture the natural gas inside oil shale formations. The U.S. Energy Information Administration notes that “adding the identified shale gas resources to other gas resources increases total world technically recoverable gas resources by over 40 percent to 22,600 trillion cubic feet.” **It may be tough for methane hydrates**, as a new and unorthodox gas resource that may not be able to reach a significant commercial scale for 10 to 15 more years, **to make much headway against that competition.** Then again, maybe not. Certain factors might be more advantageous to methane hydrate development than one would think. The first is that nations like Japan, which now have huge and expensive industrial energy costs, have extraordinary incentives to use the methane hydrates off their coasts. Japan has already announced that it hopes to begin some level of methane production from its Nankai Trough hydrates by 2018. So whether or not methane hydrates seem to make much economic sense here in the U.S., for example, other countries will be pushing the technology ahead regardless. Energy companies may also see reasons to develop methane hydrates based on synergies with their other interests. In my interview with Timothy Collett of the U.S. Geological Survey, he pointed out that conventional natural gas comes out of the ground carrying a lot of CO2. (For example, the natural gas emerging from Alaska’s North Slope wells is about 10 percent CO2 [pdf].) By law, natural gas producers must remove that CO2 before they can store or transport their product but they cannot release it into the air. Yet if CO2 sequestration into hydrates proves feasible, Collett says, gas companies could use waste CO2 from their conventional gas wells to drive further methane production from the hydrates. He also pointed out that oil companies working Alaska’s North Slope might find that developing methane hydrates could help them to maintain oil production. As oilfields there run dry, the companies now keep wells alive by pumping gas down into the reservoirs to maintain pressure. The methane from hydrates could become a handy local source of gas for recharging the wells: instead of distributing the methane as fuel, the companies could use it to keep their production of more valuable oil going. (That incentive would surely be a mixed blessing in the eyes of climate hawks looking to move the global economy away from production and use of oil and coal. Still, perhaps it is still of value as a lesser-of-two-evils transitional step toward an energy infrastructure in which natural gas can more easily substitute for oil.) **It is also not yet a foregone conclusion that natural gas production from oil shales has a clear way forward**. Though I am personally pessimistic about the odds of environmental or public health concerns standing in the way of the moneyed energy interests in this case, **the huge and unsettled controversies about whether fracking is safe might yet trip up oil shale development**. **If so, the environmental desirability to find good, affordable sources of natural gas will still exist, which could help sustain interest in methane hydrates.**

***Extinction***

**Heinberg 4** (Richard, Award-Winning Author and Core Faculty Member of New College of California, “Power Down: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World,” pp.122-4)

**Methane hydrates represent an even larger store of hydrocarbons in Earth’s crust**; however, in the end, the prospects for exploiting them may be even more discouraging than is the case with tar sands.

As marine organisms decompose, they release methane. Under certain conditions, that methane can become trapped on the ocean floor in ice crystals, and can build up over time. The resulting mixture of methane and ice is called methane hydrate. This material is also sometimes found in permanently frozen soil on land: there are, for example, methane hydrate deposits in Siberia and Alaska. **Oceanic methane hydrates are so plentiful that**, in theory, **they could power the world for centuries**. Some estimates put the total at more than twice the amount of all other fossil fuels combined. However, the harvesting of the resource constitutes a technical problem of immense proportions. **As hydrate material is mined and brought to the ocean surface, it fizzes and bubbles as methane turns to gas and dissolves in the water**. Eventually, **the methane makes its way into the atmosphere**. The problem then is not merely that a potentially valuable substance has been lost, but that **a previously stored greenhouse gas has been loosed on the environment.** The most frequently discussed greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide, which is released with the burning of fossil fuels. However, ***methane is over twenty times as effective as carbon dioxide at trapping the heat from sunlight***. Thus, ***if a significant quantity of methane were to be freed into the atmosphere, the resulting contribution to global warming could be cataclysmic***. Is there enough methane trapped in hydrates to make much of a difference in this regard? There is, and by a long shot. Altogether, ***there is roughly 3,000 times more methane locked up as hydrates than is currently found in Earth’s atmosphere***. Even without attempts at commercial exploitation, oceanic hydrates are already responsible for between 5 and 10 million tons of methane emissions to the atmosphere each year. Seabed methane hydrates already represent a serious environmental threat in the context of global-warming trends. As the temperature of the oceans rises, hydrate deposits may become unstable**. This could release large amounts of methane into the atmosphere, thus greatly exacerbating the greenhouse effect, which would in turn warm the oceans even further. The result could be a self-reinforcing feedback loop with unimaginably horrific consequences.** Adding commercial extraction procedures to this existing precarious situation hardly seems prudent. Some scientists, including Charles Paull, a researcher with the Monterey Bay Aquarium, say that extracting gas hydrates could disrupt seafloor stability.1 Geologists suspect that the large-scale breakdown of methane hydrate deposits was responsible for huge underwater landslips and the creation of massive tsunami waves earlier in Earth’s history, as well as for sudden periods of intense global warming**. If in the future unstable hydrates were dislodged by attempts to extract them, the result could be a modern rerun of those ancient cataclysms, with immense waves sloshing across the oceans, scouring the surfaces of islands and inundating coastal cities, while the entire planet baked under a methane fog.** Nonetheless**, when the human economic need is great enough, we can be sure that attempts will be made to produce usable energy from methane hydrates**. Resource-poor Japan (which imports nearly all of its oil and gas) is already involved in research in hydrate beds along the Nankai Trough, some 3,500 feet (1,100 meters) under water, and at an international test site in the frozen Mackenzie River delta in northern Canada. In 2002, the Japan National Oil Corporation announced some success in the Mackenzie Delta tests. Japan hopes to determine by 2011 whether commercial methane hydrate mining is feasible; if it is, efforts could begin by 2015. In the US, Congress has appropriated $47 million for methane hydrate research over the next few years — though many of the funded projects are mostly academic, with methane deposits on the moons of Jupiter and Saturn envisioned as a fuel source for future space travel. However, as the North American natural gas crisis deepens, **there will be increasing incentive to explore the possibility of extracting methane from coastal seabeds or frozen tundras.** The US Geological Survey has estimated that the quantity of gas hydrates in the United States is equal to roughly 200 times the conventional natural gas resources remaining in the country; according to the Department of Energy, if only one percent of the deposits could be exploited for domestic consumption, the US could more than double its supply of energy resources. The exploitation of land-based methane hydrates is especially likely to garner increasing interest — but the technical hurdles in this instance are almost as problematic as in the case of seabed deposits. Russian engineers have suggested pumping nuclear waste under the Siberian permafrost to thaw the hydrate fields there so that they can be exploited. Such methods are sure to provoke quite an outcry from environmentalists and native populations if applied in North America. Will methane hydrates be the energy source of the future? Don’t hold your breath. The inevitable efforts in that direction may or may not yield useful net energy; in either case, intense battles will be waged between environmentalists on one hand and government and industry leaders on the other. The stakes will be breathtaking: if the concerns of Earth scientists are well founded, and if a miscalculation were to occur, the damage could be incalculable**. With the development of the hydrogen bomb, humanity was forced to confront the fact that it had invented a means for its own extinction. If an industry emerges devoted to seabed methane hydrate extraction, humankind might find itself facing another similarly stark awakening.**

**A2: Exports Not Feasible**

***Plan’s key to investment in infrastructure***

**The Economist ‘12**

3-6, The emerging energy consensus <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/03/energy-and-election>, jj

**Regulatory uncertainty should be minimised**. This is a common complaint in most industries and it's debatable whether we should be sympathetic in general. In America, some degree of uncertainty is an entirely predictable consequence of the political system, and some analyses find no evidence that regulatory uncertainty is actually a drag on business. **Energy**, however, **has a more solid complaint** than industry in general: **most forms of energy production require massive capital projects, and no one is keen to spend a few billion on a LNG export terminal if there's a good chance the regulatory context will have changed significantly by the time construction is completed.**

***It’s feasible***

**Kientz ‘12**

I am an investor and author who has owned and managed real estate, precious metals, stocks, and bond investments. My full time position in Audit has given me a unique perspective on how a risk-based approach to running companies parallels a risk-based approach to establishing a growing portfolio of investments.

8-15, Seeking Alpha, The Answer To The Oil Dilemma? Natural Gas - Part 2 Of 2 <http://seekingalpha.com/article/809541-the-answer-to-the-oil-dilemma-natural-gas-part-2-of-2>, jj

**US companies will be best positioned to fill those import gaps** in the next decade. **The US currently has one liquefaction facility and shipbuilders are building** LNG FSRU's **as fast as possible to transport** and regasify those inventories onsite at various demand locations. In addition, as oil gets more expensive, **infrastructure build outs in the US geared toward natural gas transportation will be a booming industry**. **Several companies are positioning themselves to take advantage of this industry shift.**

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***growth is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts***

**Kaletsky, ’11** (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic

Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21, bgm)

**Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because,** unlike communism or socialism or feudalism**, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. I**n the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. **The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products.** Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, **democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years.** But regardless of the difference in timescale, **capitalism and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems. And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well.** If we consider **democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine**, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. **In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized, the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”**—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—**becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf.** Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: **"Something will turn up."**

***Turn - Waiting for a new ontology is a strategy that dooms us to nuclear omnicide and makes all the aff and neg impacts inevitable.***

**Santoni ‘85** (Ronald E., Philosophy Professor @ Denison, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often-stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

***And, no prior questions --- elevating ontological and philosophical concerns fails and trades off with pragmatic policy solutions***

**Jenkins ‘11**

Willis Jenkins, Margaret A. Farley Assistant Professor of Social Ethics, Professor Jenkins teaches environmental ethics, global ethics, and Christian social thought. He is author of Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology, which won a 2009 Templeton Award for Theological Promise, and Sustainability, Social Justice, and Christian Ethics (Georgetown, in press). He is editor of The Spirit of Sustainability (2009) and coeditor of Bonhoeffer and King: Their Legacies and Import for Christian Social Thought (2010). He has written recent journal articles on ethics in the environmental sciences, on homelessness and urban theory, and on the field of religion and ecology.

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51-74 (Article) PROJECT MUSE, jj

Pragmatism: Making Ethics Practical

**Pragmatists** often **introduce their strategy of practical reason with an opening complaint that cosmological strategies of environmental ethics have not proven their practical worth**. **That complaint about effectiveness introduces a pragmatic proposal for less metaphysical debate and more attention to creating broad agreement on policy responses to practical problems**. The editors of the anthology Environmental Pragmatism thus set the scene: On the one hand, the discipline…has produced a wide variety of positions and theories in an attempt to derive morally justifiable and adequate environmental policies. On the other hand, **it is difficult to see what practical effect the field of environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy**. (Light and Katz 1995, 1) Ben Minteer and Robert Manning blame the field’s ineffectiveness on its cosmological innovations: “**urgent calls for new environmental worldviews and radically revised ontological schemes, rather than leading to improved environmental solutions and conditions, only lead ethicists’ attention away from the resources already present within our shared moral and political traditions**.” In consequence, **the field exhibits a “conspicuous silence regarding concrete solutions to real world environmental dilemmas**” (2003, 319). Minteer and Manning follow the problem-solving approach opened by Bryan Norton, who contrasts his authentically “practical philosophy” with “**axiological” value theories** that, in his view, **have narrowed topics of discussion, reduced possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration, and led to a communicative breakdown between science and society** (2003, 47–63). For Norton, **sustainability depends on an integrative, adaptive ethos developed from science-based responses to specific problems** (2005). **Pragmatists thus present their ethic of contextual problem-solving by pressing the dilemma between radical cosmological change and practical political engagement.** **Pragmatists expect environmental ethics to be practical in two ways: (1) by working with available moral resources, (2) for the sake of resolving specific policy problems.** **With both elements working together, they say, ethics can help achieve effective social response to environmental problems**. Andrew **Light thus asks ethicists to attend to cultural contexts by trying to “work within traditional moral psychologies and ethical theories that people already have” in order to create links between existing moral priorities in specific communities and the ends of environmental concern** (2003, 235). **Practical ethics requires, he says, a “practical anthropology,” attentive to the environmental interests and commitments that people hold, with a view toward “generating creative ways to persuade a variety of people” to adopt environmental solutions** (2003, 241).

***2. Perm – do both - Action and reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.***

**Padrutt, 92** – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, *Heidegger and the Earth*, “Heidegger and Ecology,” ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

***3. Prefer the aff’s incrementalism to the alt’s inaction --- refusal to embrace bridge fuels like the aff guarantees environmental collapse***

Charles K. **Ebinger**, Director, Energy Security Initiative Govinda Avasarala, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative The Brookings Institution 4-22-**10**, Environmental Pragmatism <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0422_environmental_pragmatism_ebinger.aspx>, jj

Finally, **people need to embrace pragmatism**. **Though it is not ideal and rarely a sexy declaration, pragmatism and incrementalism are** the **obligatory** taxes of multilateral agreements (mind you, they are less obtrusive with fewer parties). **There are many tools at our disposal that can put the stalled climate change efforts into first gear**. First, **we must embrace bridge technologies, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and state of the art cleaner coal**. **With total global renewable energy capacity falling catastrophically short of global energy demand, ‘bridge’ technologies can ease the environmental strain while we wait for renewable capacity to reach requisite levels**. In addition, investments in upgrading many nations’ electricity grids will make a remarkable difference in the environmental impact of power generation. **The need for action to reduce climate change is very real, particularly as many emerging economies and failed and near-failed states are most at risk and can potentially spur widespread global unrest**. **Clinging to an inefficient, incapable system will only exacerbate the crisis of inaction at a time where the world can ill-afford it. By focusing on smaller negotiations** with actual large emitters, garnering a better understanding of the real economics behind climate change, **and embracing smaller steps in ‘bridge’ technologies, we can do a far more effective job of getting the ball rolling.**

***Coal is inevitable in the world of the alt – turns the K***

**Wendland ‘11**

Joel Wendland is editor of Political Affairs magazine. He is a union member and a US Army veteran.

7-20-11, People’s World, Coal pollution killing poor, people of color, NAACP charges <http://www.peoplesworld.org/coal-pollution-killing-poor-people-of-color-naacp-charges/>, jj

**America is addicted to coal, and that addiction is killing poor people and people of color**, according to a new report published by the NAACP and other environmental justice organizations. According to the report, **emissions from 431 coal plants across the country cause 30,000 premature deaths and tens of thousands incidents of chronic respiratory health problems like asthma, bronchitis and lung cancer each year**. According to the study, titled "Coal Blooded: Putting Profits Before People," Sulfur dioxide (SO2) and Nitrogen Oxide (NOx), **coal plants produce nearly all of the SO2 and fine particle pollution in the U.S.** Coal-powered plants produce about 44 percent of the electricity used in the U.S. Ten states use about half of the total amount of coal-fired electricity produced in the whole country. **More than 8 million people live within three miles of a coal power plant, and those people are disproportionately poor or people of color**. The average per capita income of those people total less than $19,000, substantially lower than the national average. About 3 million are people of color, the report found. The report also revealed the locations of the worst coal plants in the countries. These "**failing plants" produce the most pollution and impact the largest number of poor and people of color.** To be precise, **90 "failing plants" across the country produced a quarter of SO2 and one-fifth of NOx emissions in the entire country. More than half of the 4.7 million people who live near these plants are people of color.** Of the 90 "failing plants," the report scrutinizes the 12 worst offenders. Three are owned by Edison International and are located in Illinois. PSEG owns two of the worst offenders in Connecticut and New Jersey. Duke Energy, DTE Energy, and Dominion are among the companies whose plants create the greatest harm. **Detroit, Michigan is host to one of the worst pollution-producing plants in the country**. The River Rouge Power Plant (DTE Energy), located on the southwest edge of the city produces more than 13,000 tons of SO2 and 4,658 tons of NOx each year. **The plant is just five miles from downtown Detroit and just across the Rouge River from the only major Latino district in the city, known as "Mexican Town." Of the residents who live within three miles of the River Rouge plant, more than 65 percent are African Americans and Latinos. Average income for people living in the area is just over $13,000 each year. The study attributed 44 premature deaths and hundreds of asthma attacks each year to the pollution from just this one plant.** Another deadly culprit is the Hammond, Indiana plant owned by Dominion. Located on outskirts of Chicago, this plant emits almost 17,000 tons of SO2 and NOx pollution. Of the people living within three miles of the plant, almost 80 percent are African Americans and Latinos. In that same corridor along the southern edge of Lake Michigan between Chicago and the Michigan border are six other coal-fired power plants that contribute to the poor health and premature deaths of mostly poor communities of color. The authors of the report called for immediately closing the 90 "failing plants." **While they total about 20 percent of the coal-fired plants in the country, they produce less than 10 percent of its electricity.** In addition, **closing those plants would reduce the number of people living within three miles of a coal-fired plant by 58 percent and reduce the number of emergency room visits, deaths and chronic illnesses by thousands each year.**

***Earth is so over-run with human control that relinquishing anthropocentrism now wouldn’t solve – it would be impossible for nature to take its course – only pragmatism solves***

**Katz ’99** (Eric, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Winter, Environmental Ethics, Vol 21, “A Pragmatic Reconsideration of Anthropocentrism,” jj)

What about the nonanthropocentric argument regarding beach replenishment? A nonanthropocentric argument, by definition, will not consider as primary the benefits that humans will obtain from a particular policy—so many of the reasons just listed cannot be considered. **From a perspective of nonanthropocentric ecological holism, we should let natural processes take their course for the good of the overall ecological community**. **If the beach erodes, the erosion is part of the normal natural dynamics of the shoreline ecosystem. Indeed, most of the sand is not lost to the system; it simply shifts its location**, for undeveloped and unprotected barrier islands have a tendency to move landward over the course of time. Sand moves from the ocean side of the island to the bay side. The movement and displacement of sand would result in the loss of houses, especially along the immediate ocean waterfront, but this loss would not be a negative impact for the natural ecosystem. In addition, letting the natural erosion process continue without interference might lead to the possible reemergence or resurgence of those species that have been harmed by human housing development along the shore—such as the piping plover and the least and roseate terns. Thus, **a nonanthropocentric perspective would lead to a policy in which the shoreline would continue to erode as sands naturally shift.** The beach would be “restored” in a sense to a more natural state. On first examination, thus, there is a clear pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. One position favors a policy of beach replenishment and the other does not. However, **there is a major complication to this analysis** that I want to consider. **The idea that we can let nature take its course in this case is problematic.** On my view, **the beaches** of Fire Island **are now an artifactual system, considerably modified by human development**—particularly bulkheading and jetties. Except for the wilderness areas, almost the entire north side of Fire Island is bulkheaded, with docks and artificially dredged harbors and boat slips. Thus, **the natural movement of sand by water currents has been disrupted** for about a hundred years, and indeed part of the erosion problem is caused by the fact that the sand, when it migrates to the bay side of the island, has no place to land—the bulkheading acts like a seawall and prevents the accumulation of sand dropped by the smaller estuarine waves of the Great South Bay. Sand migrating over the island by wind, waves, and tidal surges is also prevented from a natural buildup by the humanmade physical structures and human activity. (One of the common early spring chores is to sweep the winter’s accumulation of sand off the main sidewalks. But the sand’s movement to the north is relentless—the sidewalks have to be swept weekly during the summer months.) **Given the current state of development on the island it would be impossible to let nature take its course**; the island no longer has a natural configuration. (Of course, there would be one radical way to solve this problem: the park service could condemn all the private homes on the island, destroy them, and rip out all human-made physical structures. The economic cost of this plan would be astronomical, both in outof- pocket expenses and in the lost revenue from tourism and real-estate taxes.) Thus, if the beach is an artifactual system, the question to be asked changes: What is the pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism regarding the policy of beach replenishment for a nonnatural artifactual beach system? **The anthropocentric argument appears essentially to be the same as before. We still want to promote human interests by saving and preserving the beach— only now we recognize that it is not a natural beach, but an artifactual one**. We are still going to preserve the island for human benefits and human interests. We still want to protect the private homes and provide a recreational beach. We can even argue that the artifactual beach system is necessary to protect the relatively undisturbed wilderness area that lies on the landward side of the dunes. The anthropocentric argument thus does not change. However, **the nonanthropocentric ecological holistic argument is now largely irrelevant, for we are only dealing with an artifactual system**, or at best a hybrid of natural and artifactual. **Such a system is essentially human-based, so that human interests and concerns dominate any evaluation**. I have previously analyzed the difference between artifacts and natural entities—and I will not repeat arguments I have made in some detail in other places.23 I have argued that it is the presence of human intentionality in a natural system that irrevocably modifies nature and establishes an artifactual system. The introduction of human purpose is the key to understanding the difference between artifactual and natural systems. The reason why we create artifacts, why we interfere in natural processes, is to further human goals and interests. We tend to evaluate the worth of our artifacts and human-made systems by their success in achieving our human-centered aims. Thus, we will value the Fire Island system to the extent that it meets our aims and goals. **We cannot return** Fire Island **to a “natural” state**. **Thus, we cannot use what is beneficial to the overall ecological community as the sole guide to environmental decision-making. We must consider the satisfaction of human interests in the evaluation of** environmental **policies** on Fire Island. As an artifactual system—or as a hybrid of the natural and the artifactual—Fire Island must be evaluated from a perspective that includes anthropocentrism. Thus, Fire Island will have to be managed— perhaps preserved in terms of long-range sustainability—so that it best achieves the human goals that have been incorporated into its development. In this case, pragmatism as a methodology—as a means of testing theoretical ideas for their “cash-value” in terms of practical consequences—teaches us that a **simplistic reliance on theoretical concepts such as anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism will fail to address adequately the complexities of the policy situation.** Pragmatism endorses a vision beyond the facile dualisms of nonanthropocentrism and anthropocentrism, natural and artifactual. Without resorting to the substantive content of pragmatism as a moral philosophy, **we can see the need for flexibility, compromise, and a pluralism of values in the analysis of concrete environmental policy decisions. When dealing with a hybrid system of humanity and nature, we need to use all of the relevant theoretical concepts, crossing and recrossing the boundaries that separate anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism**. Pragmatism cannot, in the end, tell us how to effect the compromise; it cannot tell us what specific policies we should adopt in all situations. **Pragmatism** simply **reminds us to be open to a wide range of possibly relevant and meaningful values in the formation and justification of policy.**

***Alt doesn’t solve --- There is no root cause to environmental destruction – assuming so prevents effective solutions to specific issues***

**Garrard 4** (Greg, PhD in Humanities and Cultural Industries @ Liverpool U, “Ecocriticism”, pp.

176-178, Questia) JPG

Much **ecocriticism has taken for granted that its task is to overcome anthropocentrism**, just as feminism seeks to overcome androcentrism. The metaphysical argument for biocentrism is meant to sustain moral claims about the intrinsic value of the natural world, which will in turn affect our attitudes and behaviour towards nature. **Wilderness experiences, or apocalyptic threats, or Native American ways of life, are supposed to provide the impetus** or the example by which individuals come **to an authentic selfhood orientated toward right environmental action. Whilst the importance of changing** the **minds** and lives of individuals **is undeniable, this book has aimed to show the political dimension that this moralistic emphasis may occlude.** However, the politicisation of ecocriticism does pose its own problems. Dwelling on the troubling example of Heidegger (Chapter 6), who espoused both Nazism and a kind of deep ecology, Jonathan Bate asserts in The Song of the Earth that 'The dilemma of Green reading is that it must, yet it cannot, separate ecopoetics from ecopolitics' (2000:266). Environmentalism is compatible with most political positions, and while we have seen possible dangers inherent in this, it might also give us a clear argument for better, not less, political attunement in ecocriticism. Bate rightly points out that poets are not the engineers of the world, and that literature cannot provide specific solutions, which means that ecocriticism must continue to adopt and adapt theories from feminist and Marxist traditions, enabling positive engagement in cultural politics. I would argue that the promise of ecofeminist literary and cultural theory has yet to be realised. With important exceptions such as Haraway, Armbruster, Westling and Murphy, such criticism has been held back by the overstated anti-rationalism and gynocentric dualism of radical ecofeminism. The work of Australian philosopher Val Plumwood offers ecofeminism a sound basis for a much-needed critique of the dynamics of domination as they operate in a range of cultural contexts. **A monolithically conceived root cause of environmental destruction**, be it labelled anthropocentrism or androcentrism **is bound to misrepresent the complexity of causation in the real world**. **Ecofeminism**, modified by dialogue with social ecological positions**, can provide insight into the cultural operations of environmental injustice**. In this way, the fusion of environmental and social development agendas that has occurred so strikingly within and between global NGOs might come to ecocriticism; Beyond Nature Writing (2001), edited by Karla Armbruster and Kathleen Wallace, includes several essays in this emergent field of enquiry. Ecocritics therefore continue to experiment with hybridised reading practices, drawing on various philosophical and literary theoretical sources. Bennett and Teague's The Nature of Cities (1999) reveals a new emphasis on bringing cultural theorists such as Cronon, Ross, Luke and Haraway into dialogue with literary ecocritics, thereby consolidating the field around a critical encounter between genres, perspectives and politics. The work of Richard Kerridge is exemplary in this respect: he writes with as much insight about postmodern risk as he does about Thomas Hardy. Harrison's eclectic Forests (1993), which ranges from Grimm fairy tales to the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright, fosters the making of connections between disparate cultural phenomena without eliminating their peculiarities. Bate and Buell first published books that identified a single 'environmental tradition' in Britain and the USA, stemming from Wordsworth and Thoreau respectively. In later works, however, they favour an explicitly dialectical approach. In The Song of the Earth, Wordsworth's piety is leavened with Byron's wit, and Heidegger's portentousness gets a learned sneer from Theodor Adorno. For Buell, Writing for an Endangered World involves juxtaposing urbanites like Theodor Dreiser and Gwendolyn Brooks with the more obvious candidates for ecocritical treatment, Jeffers and Berry. Drawing upon such diverse resources of hope enables ecocriticism to connect with the urban and suburban places in which most of us will continue to live, and will add depth to the ecological critique of modernity; **material and economic progress is no more the root of all evils than it is an unalloyed benefit to people or the natural world**. By such means **the risk of fostering reactionary politics might be minimized.**

*6. Can’t solve calc thought --- too entrenched*

**Riis 11**—Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Søren, 8 February 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,”)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely ***simultaneously with the very origin of human beings***. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is ***connected to being human***. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell.

## Finals v JMU BL

**A2: T – Your Restrictions Must Directly Restrict Production**

***1) We meet – our regs directly restrict production --- your violation evidence notes the GOAL of regulation, not the OBJECT of the regulation which is production:***

***NSPS & NESHAPR***

**GAO ‘12**

Government Accountability Office <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1012R>, jj

GAO reviewed **the** Environmental Protection Agency (**EPA**) new **rule on** new source performance standards (**NSPS) and** ***n***ational ***e***mission ***s***tandards for ***h***azardous ***a***ir ***p***ollutants ***r***eviews. GAO found that (1) the final action finalizes the review of new source performance standards for the listed oil and natural gas source category. In this action the EPA revised the NSPS for volatile organic compounds from leaking components at onshore natural gas processing plants and new source performance standards for sulfur dioxide emissions **from natural gas processing plants**. **The EPA** also **established standards for** certain oil and **gas operations** not covered by the existing standards. In addition to the operations covered by the existing standards, **the newly established standards will regulate** volatile organic compound emissions from **gas wells**, centrifugal compressors, reciprocating compressors, pneumatic controllers and storage vessels. **This action also finalizes the** residual risk and technology **review for** the Oil and **Natural Gas Production** source category and the Natural Gas Transmission and Storage source category. This action includes revisions to the existing leak detection and repair requirements. In addition, the EPA has established in this action emission limits reflecting maximum achievable control technology for certain currently uncontrolled emission sources in these source categories. This action also includes modification and addition of testing and monitoring and related notification, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, as well as other minor technical revisions to the national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants. **This action finalizes revisions to the regulatory provisions related to emissions during periods of startup, shutdown and malfunction**; and (2) EPA complied with applicable requirements in promulgating the rule.

#### 2) Counter-interp: CI – “Restrictions” includes “regulations” – this evidence is energy specific

Davies 30 (Major George, “CLAUSE 1.—(Scheme regulating production, supply and sale of coal.),” February, vol 235 cc2453-558, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1930/feb/27/clause-1-scheme-regulating-production)

Major GEORGE DAVIES The hon. Member says he has heard no reason advanced for this Amendment. I am willing to give him one, and I will tell him that the reason why the benches are not full, as they were a short time ago, is that man cannot live by bread alone and, as there is a rule against the introduction of newspapers and foodstuffs, it is necessary for some of us to refresh ourselves after a late Division. I am not going to transgress the ruling of the Chair, as we have been given very great latitude, but I want to confine myself to the point at issue, which is the regulation of sale. I have had experience in the past of efforts to regulate the sale of sugar. Like the coal industry to-day, there has been in the past an over-production of many of the fundamental articles of the life of a nation. I will not dwell on the case of rubber, but the sugar situation was entirely on all fours with this situation, as it was a question of the regulation of sale. Facing a situation very similar in kind and not dissimilar in degree to the problem now before us, those connected with that particular industry in certain countries thought it an advantage to control and regulate the sale. As soon as you use the word "regulation" in this connection it is idle to suggest that it does not mean restriction. Obviously, that is the point—to restrict—and, while 2541 it is true the word "restrict" is not in this particular Clause, and cannot be argued in connection with this Amendment, yet behind the word "regulate" is the word "restrict," in other words, controlling what has been uncontrolled, production thrown on markets not able to receive it.

### A2: Fracking Bad – Methane

***NG still better despite methane***

L. M. **Cathles**, June 6, 20**12**

After receiving his PhD from Princeton, Professor Larry Cathles joined Kennecott Copper Corporation where he investigated the genesis of porphyry copper deposits and industrial leaching processes. In 1978 he joined the faculty at Pennsylvania State University where his research focus was on the formation of massive sulfide deposits at mid-ocean ridges and in failed rifts in Japan. In 1982 he joined the Chevron Oil Field Research Laboratory where he developed genetic and exploration models for gold and sulfide deposits and investigated the C02 generation that often attends steam injection for enhanced oil recovery. In 1987 Cathles came to Cornell as an earth scientist who addresses the Earth processes with the perspective of a physicist. His fundamental approach is to construct physical process models that predict chemical change; to develop models that simulate the chemical alteration caused by the movements of water in the subsurface for example. Cathles has published over 110 peer-reviewed publications and a book: "The Viscosity of the Earth`s Mantle". Presently he is a co-leader of the oil and gas thrust of the Cornell KAUST program and Director of the Cornell Institute for the Study of the Continents.

Assessing the greenhouse impact of natural gas

<http://www.geo.cornell.edu/eas/PeoplePlaces/Faculty/cathles/Natural%20Gas/Assessing%20the%20greenhouse%20impact%20of%20natural%20gas%20FINAL%20UNFORMTTED.pdf>

The global warming impact of substituting natural gas for coal and oil is currently in debate. We address this question here by comparing the reduction of greenhouse warming that would result from substituting gas for coal and some oil to the reduction which could be achieved by instead substituting zero carbon energy sources. We show that **substitution** **of natural gas reduces global warming by 40%** of that which could be attained by the substitution of zero carbon energy sources. At **methane leakage rates that are ~1% of production**, which is similar to today’s probable leakage rate of ~1.5% of production, the 40% benefit is realized as gas substitution occurs. For short transitions the leakage rate must be more than 10 to 15% of production for gas substitution not to reduce warming, and for longer transitions the leakage must be much greater. But **even if the leakage was so high** that the substitution was not of immediate benefit, **the 40%**‐of‐zero‐carbon **benefit would be realized shortly after methane emissions ceased because methane is removed quickly from the atmosphere whereas CO2 is not**. The benefits of substitution are unaffected by heat exchange to the ocean. **CO2 emissions are the key to anthropogenic climate change, and substituting gas reduces them by 40%** of that possible by conversion to zero carbon energy sources. Gas substitution also reduces the rate at which zero carbon energy sources must be eventually introduced.

### A2: heg unsustainable

#### We can stay number 1 absent a self-inflicted wound

**Walt ’11** (Stephen, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, the National Interest, Nov/Dec, Iss. 116, p. 6-16 (11 pp.), “The End of the American Era” proquest, jj)

Don't get me wrong. **The United States is not finished** as a major power. **Nor is it destined to become just one of several equals in a future multipolar world**. To the contrary, **the United States still has the world's strongest military, and the U.S. economy remains diverse and technologically advanced**. **China's economy may soon be larger** in absolute terms, **but its per capita income will be far smaller, which means its government will have less surplus to devote to expanding its reach** (including of the military variety). **American expenditures on higher education and industrial research and development still dwarf those of other countries, the dollar remains the world's reserve currency and many states continue to clamor for U.S. protection**. Furthermore, **long-term projections of U.S. latent power are reassuring**. **Populations in Russia, Japan and most European countries are declining and aging, which will limit their economic potential in the decades ahead.** **China's median age is also rising rapidly** (an unintended consequence of the one-child policy), **and this will be a powerful drag on its economic vitality**. By contrast, **U.S. population growth is high compared with the rest of the developed world, and U.S. median age will be lower than any of the other serious players**. Indeed, **in some ways America's strategic position is actually more favorable than it used to be**, which is why its bloated military budget is something of a mystery. In 1986, for example, the United States and its allies controlled about 49 percent of global military expenditures while our various adversaries combined for some 42 percent. Today, **the United States and its allies are responsible for nearly 70 percent of military spending; all our adversaries put together total less than 1 5 percent**. Barring additional self-inflicted wounds, **the United States is not going to fall from the ranks of the great powers at any point in the next few decades.** Whether the future world is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, Washington is going to be one of those poles - and almost certainly the strongest of them.

### 2ac A2: Exports Not Feasible

#### Plan’s key to investment in infrastructure

**The Economist ‘12**

3-6, The emerging energy consensus <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/03/energy-and-election>, jj

**Regulatory uncertainty should be minimised**. This is a common complaint in most industries and it's debatable whether we should be sympathetic in general. In America, some degree of uncertainty is an entirely predictable consequence of the political system, and some analyses find no evidence that regulatory uncertainty is actually a drag on business. **Energy**, however, **has a more solid complaint** than industry in general: **most forms of energy production require massive capital projects, and no one is keen to spend a few billion on a LNG export terminal if there's a good chance the regulatory context will have changed significantly by the time construction is completed.**

#### It’s feasible

**Kientz ‘12**

I am an investor and author who has owned and managed real estate, precious metals, stocks, and bond investments. My full time position in Audit has given me a unique perspective on how a risk-based approach to running companies parallels a risk-based approach to establishing a growing portfolio of investments.

8-15, Seeking Alpha, The Answer To The Oil Dilemma? Natural Gas - Part 2 Of 2 <http://seekingalpha.com/article/809541-the-answer-to-the-oil-dilemma-natural-gas-part-2-of-2>, jj

US companies will be best positioned to fill those import gaps in the next decade. The US currently has one liquefaction facility and shipbuilders are building LNG FSRU's as fast as possible to transport and regasify those inventories onsite at various demand locations. In addition, as oil gets more expensive, infrastructure build outs in the US geared toward natural gas transportation will be a booming industry. Several companies are positioning themselves to take advantage of this industry shift.

 **A2: Exports Bad – Domestic Prices**

***No significant price increases from exports – studies***

**Deloitte, 2011** (The Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, provides a forum for innovation, thought leadership, groundbreaking research, and industry collaboration to help companies solve the most complex energy challenges, leads the debate on critical topics, provide comprehensive solutions through a global network of specialists and thought leaders & Deloitte MarketPoint, a decision support solutions company focused on fundamental market analysis and price forecasting, “Made in America: The economic impact of LNG exports from the United States,” <http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_MadeinAmerica_LNGPaper_122011.pdf>, ts)

***The WGM results indicate that U.S. prices will not significantly increase due to LNG export***. **The projected change in the average U.S. price is a rather modest $0.12/ MMBtu, a 1.7% increase over the Reference Case without LNG export**s. The projected impact is greatest near the export terminals but dissipates with distance away from the Gulf region. **The price impact is less than $0.10/ MMBtu in most downstream markets. Given the projected price impact, it is highly unlikely that it would cause U.S. industry to be uncompetitive in global markets and lead to a loss of jobs**. The U.S. has lower gas prices than most industrialized countries and is projected to continue to have lower gas prices, in part due to continued growth in shale gas production. An increase in gas price of less than 2% is unlikely to change the U.S. competitiveness in global markets. Furthermore, **even with exports, U.S. prices will be lower than those in the importing countries.** **Otherwise, export would be uneconomic**. The high cost of constructing a liquefaction plant plus the high transportation cost of a LNG tanker is estimated to require a spread of at least $3.00/MMBtu to Europe and over $4.00/MMBtu to Asia in order to make LNG export economic to those regions. Exporting LNG from the U.S. is being considered now because the price spreads from the U.S. Gulf to Europe and Asia are well above those levels. However, **the key point is that even with LNG exports, the U.S. has a built-in cost advantage for natural gas because of the cost differential to get LNG to European and Asian markets**. ***LNG exports alone cannot elevate U.S. prices to European and Asian price levels because of the cost differential***. To illustrate this point, consider the Gulf to the MidAtlantic regions which are connected by major pipelines. However, Mid-Atlantic prices are still substantially higher than Gulf prices because of the transportation costs. At specific market hubs, such as New York City, prices can skyrocket during extreme peak demand days because of deliverability constraints on the pipeline system. Even though markets are connected, deliverability constraints can and will decouple their prices during peak periods. The total European gas demand is nearly as large as the U.S. demand. The LNG export volume being considered represents a small fraction of European demand, as well as U.S. supply. The proposed LNG export volumes are inadequate to bring these markets to parity because of transportation costs and capacity constraints.

### States CP 2ac

#### 2. The CP would be send a massive signal of unpredictability and confusion from the court

Ford 5

Matthew Ford, Law Student at St John's University School of Law in New York. 9/15/05. “John Roberts, Stare Decisis, and the Return of Lochner: An Impetus to Jump-Start the Labor Movement.” Mr. Zine Magazine, A Project of the Monthly Review. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ford180905.html

Our common law system is based largely on the idea of "stare decisis," the idea that the rulings of judges are generally binding. Such a system is designed to create continuity so as to send a signal to society about what sort of behavior society will or will not tolerate, to avoid confusion certain to arise if laws are constantly changing, and to diminish the likelihood of agitating society as a whole or creating a backlash by overturning laws that are widely valued. However, as Judge Roberts put it, "[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). The Supreme Court can overturn precedent when it sees fit, or, in the words of Roberts, "You have to consider whether [precedent has] created settled expectations that should not be disrupted in the interest of regularity in the legal system" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). If Roberts sticks to his word, large, well-organized, militant groups such as the Women's Rights Movement should find comfort in the fact that Roberts has implicitly acknowledged that the overturning of such a key precedent as Roe v. Wade would likely lead to large-scale upheaval by the well-organized feminist movement that would shake society so forcefully that to even fathom overturning the ruling is to start trouble.

### Russia oil 2ac

#### 1) Turn --- low oil prices are key to the Russian economy

**Illarionov 04** (Dr. Andrei, senior fellow at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity and former chief economic adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, lexis)

A: The impact of high oil prices on the rate of economic growth is twofold. On the one hand, high prices do ensure an inflow of financial resources into the sector of the Russian economy engaged in production, transportation and export of oil and petroleum products. That sector generates about 20 percent of the GDP and employs 1.7 percent of the working population (2.1 percent if one counts in the pipelines). On the other hand, **a fall of world oil prices suspends the growth of the real exchange rate of the ruble. As a result, other sectors of the Russian economy which employ about 98 percent of the working-age population** and produce 80 percent of GDP **become more competitive.** So, the high growth rate begins to spread to sectors other than oil. **The whole economy begins to grow at two-digit rates. Because growth is spread more evenly through the economy, the average growth rates ends up being higher.** This is what is happening in many CIS countries that are not oil exporters: their growth rates are 1.5-2 times higher than in Russia.

#### 2) Reliance on energy is unsustainable and they are diversifying

**Kopinski, ’11** (Mark, chief investment officer, senior vice president and senior portfolio manager for American Century Investments, a premier investment management firm, headquartered in Kansas City, MO, “Russia’s Push for Economic Diversification and Modernization,” 1/19, http://americancenturyblog.com/2011/01/russia%E2%80%99s-push-for-economic-diversificationand-modernization/, bgm)

**Russia is contending with a host of issues, including a crumbling infrastructure, an aging workforce and inadequate pension system, and the development of new gas and oil fields to replace depleting current ones. Property rights remain weak and state interference in the private sector is also problematic. One of the biggest problems facing Russia, however, is its lack of economic diversification and overreliance on revenues from oil and gas exports.** During the Great Recession, **Russia’s economic dependence on oil and gas exports manifested itself more than the country’s leaders expected. As a result of plunging commodity prices, the country was among the hardest hit by the global economic crisis and the central government’s budget went from a surplus of 4.1% in 2008 to a deficit of 6.3% in 2009. In addition, real** gross domestic product1 **(GDP) growth dropped by 7.8% in 2009— the biggest decline on record. Consequently, the government is hoping to break its economic dependency on commodity export revenues and at the same time reduce its budget deficit.** While economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most of Russia’s industrial base, the notable exceptions were the oil and gas sectors, where mismanagement and an exceptionally high rate of taxation has impeded growth and left them chronically underinvested. The good news for investors is that it is looking more likely that the government will relax its taxation of the sector and provide more incentives for exploration and development. The government is also selling stakes in a number of large state-owned companies to private investors. **Another point is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has fallen behind the West in the development of computer technology. In 2007, Russia launched an initiative to reinvigorate its tech sector, while reducing its economic reliance on commodity exports. Russian leaders are currently looking to build their own version of California’s Silicon Valley.** In March 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that his country would build a high-tech hub outside Moscow for the research and development of five priority sectors: energy, information technology, telecommunications, biomedical technology, and atomic technologies. **The Russian economy is also underdeveloped in a number of areas, including food, retail, and banking. For instance, only 30% of food is purchased through organized retail companies. The other 70% is distributed by “open-air” farmers markets, which are inefficient and where product quality can be questionable.** The increasing penetration of organized retailers is providing opportunities for investors. Another area that holds investment potential is the banking sector. Russia currently has the second fastest growing banking sector in the world behind China.

#### 3) Oil price drop doesn’t crush econ

Belton 6/18/12 (Catherine – Economic Writers for the Moscow Times, Russia earmarks $40bn to bolster economy, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1eea8e10-b94d-11e1-9bfd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ykvTHc00)

Russia is setting aside up to $40bn for this year and next to shore up the economy in case the crisis in the eurozone escalates and spreads, and is dusting off a plan that would allow the government to recapitalise the country’s banking system. In his first interview with a foreign newspaper since his appointment as finance minister last year, Anton Siluanov said the government had agreed to create a reserve mechanism worth Rbs500bn ($15.4bn) for next year “for the direct financing of anti-crisis measures”. This would include support for “socially needy people” and “systemically important enterprises”, and the revival of a scheme proposed – but not implemented – in 2009 to issue government bonds to recapitalise banks in exchange for shares, Mr Siluanov said. This year, up to Rbs800bn earmarked for one of Russia’s rainy day windfall funds – the Reserve Fund – could be spent on meeting any potential shortfall for budget obligations should the oil price stay below the average $117 a barrel at which the budget now breaks even. The Reserve Fund and the Welfare Fund currently contain $145bn.

#### Russia econ decline inevitable

**Weir, 11/3**/11 (Fred, author of Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System, “Russia's shrinking population mars Putin's superpower ambitions,” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/111102/russia-population-superpower-health-soviet-union, bgm)

**In 1991, Russia's population was nearly 150 million**. According to the US Census Bureau's international data base it's currently just under 139 million. **Projections show it plunging to 128 million in 2025, and to 109 million in 2050. "Here in Russia we have a European birth rate, but an African death rate,"** said Yury Krupnov, director of the independent Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional Development in Moscow. **"A special feature in Russia is the super-death rate for working age males, which is five times higher than the comparable rate in Europe and has ~~crippling~~ implications for our economic development." The astronomical mortality rate for young Russian men is due to a post-Soviet cocktail of bad news: deteriorating environmental conditions, collapsing health care, rising accidents due to decayed infrastructure and growing social violence. But the single biggest cause**, according to a 2009 article in The Lancet, a respected medical journal, **is the post-Soviet explosion in alcoholism. Extreme even by traditionally hard-drinking Russian standards, alcohol abuse leads to an estimated 600,000 premature deaths each year. Some warn of even more alarming consequences for the future from a population drowning in vodka. "If this tendency continues, Russia will die out,"** said Svetlana Bocherova, chair of Good Without Borders, a Moscow-based family advocacy group. **"By the 2020's the schools will be empty of children. By the next decade there won't be enough workers or soldiers. By 2050, we won't have enough people to call ourselves a country."**

### K 2ac

#### And, no prior questions --- elevating ontological and philosophical concerns fails and trades off with pragmatic policy solutions

Jenkins ‘11

Willis Jenkins, Margaret A. Farley Assistant Professor of Social Ethics, Professor Jenkins teaches environmental ethics, global ethics, and Christian social thought. He is author of Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology, which won a 2009 Templeton Award for Theological Promise, and Sustainability, Social Justice, and Christian Ethics (Georgetown, in press). He is editor of The Spirit of Sustainability (2009) and coeditor of Bonhoeffer and King: Their Legacies and Import for Christian Social Thought (2010). He has written recent journal articles on ethics in the environmental sciences, on homelessness and urban theory, and on the field of religion and ecology.

Ethics & the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, AND CULTURAL REFORM, Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp.

51-74 (Article) PROJECT MUSE, jj

Pragmatism: Making Ethics Practical

Pragmatists often introduce their strategy of practical reason with an opening complaint that cosmological strategies of environmental ethics have not proven their practical worth. That complaint about effectiveness introduces a pragmatic proposal for less metaphysical debate and more attention to creating broad agreement on policy responses to practical problems. The editors of the anthology Environmental Pragmatism thus set the scene: On the one hand, the discipline…has produced a wide variety of positions and theories in an attempt to derive morally justifiable and adequate environmental policies. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what practical effect the field of environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy. (Light and Katz 1995, 1) Ben Minteer and Robert Manning blame the field’s ineffectiveness on its cosmological innovations: “urgent calls for new environmental worldviews and radically revised ontological schemes, rather than leading to improved environmental solutions and conditions, only lead ethicists’ attention away from the resources already present within our shared moral and political traditions.” In consequence, the field exhibits a “conspicuous silence regarding concrete solutions to real world environmental dilemmas” (2003, 319). Minteer and Manning follow the problem-solving approach opened by Bryan Norton, who contrasts his authentically “practical philosophy” with “axiological” value theories that, in his view, have narrowed topics of discussion, reduced possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration, and led to a communicative breakdown between science and society (2003, 47–63). For Norton, sustainability depends on an integrative, adaptive ethos developed from science-based responses to specific problems (2005). Pragmatists thus present their ethic of contextual problem-solving by pressing the dilemma between radical cosmological change and practical political engagement. Pragmatists expect environmental ethics to be practical in two ways: (1) by working with available moral resources, (2) for the sake of resolving specific policy problems. With both elements working together, they say, ethics can help achieve effective social response to environmental problems. Andrew Light thus asks ethicists to attend to cultural contexts by trying to “work within traditional moral psychologies and ethical theories that people already have” in order to create links between existing moral priorities in specific communities and the ends of environmental concern (2003, 235). Practical ethics requires, he says, a “practical anthropology,” attentive to the environmental interests and commitments that people hold, with a view toward “generating creative ways to persuade a variety of people” to adopt environmental solutions (2003, 241).

#### 2. Perm – do both - Action and reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.

**Padrutt, 92** – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, *Heidegger and the Earth*, “Heidegger and Ecology,” ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

#### 3. Prefer the aff’s incrementalism to the alt’s inaction --- refusal to embrace bridge fuels like the aff guarantees environmental collapse

Charles K. **Ebinger**, Director, Energy Security Initiative Govinda Avasarala, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative The Brookings Institution 4-22-**10**, Environmental Pragmatism <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0422_environmental_pragmatism_ebinger.aspx>, jj

Finally, **people need to embrace pragmatism**. **Though it is not ideal and rarely a sexy declaration, pragmatism and incrementalism are** the **obligatory** taxes of multilateral agreements (mind you, they are less obtrusive with fewer parties). **There are many tools at our disposal that can put the stalled climate change efforts into first gear**. First, **we must embrace bridge technologies, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and state of the art cleaner coal**. **With total global renewable energy capacity falling catastrophically short of global energy demand, ‘bridge’ technologies can ease the environmental strain while we wait for renewable capacity to reach requisite levels**. In addition, investments in upgrading many nations’ electricity grids will make a remarkable difference in the environmental impact of power generation. **The need for action to reduce climate change is very real, particularly as many emerging economies and failed and near-failed states are most at risk and can potentially spur widespread global unrest**. **Clinging to an inefficient, incapable system will only exacerbate the crisis of inaction at a time where the world can ill-afford it. By focusing on smaller negotiations** with actual large emitters, garnering a better understanding of the real economics behind climate change, **and embracing smaller steps in ‘bridge’ technologies, we can do a far more effective job of getting the ball rolling.**

#### 4. Extinction turns the alternative

**Reilly 8**—26 year career in politics during which he founded the nation’s largest political consulting firm of its time. Reilly managed winning campaigns for a wide variety of high-profile candidates, including current Pelosi(Clint, “From Heidegger to the Environment: Californians Are in the World,” 19 August 2008, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2008/08/from\_heidegger.html,)

Even in today’s age of cutting-edge science and technology, it is important to remember that history can still be shaped by big ideas. In the 18th century, a philosophy of knowledge emboldened the Founding Fathers to build our democracy – a system of government based on the meritocracy of ideas, rights of the individual and a free press. Capitalism itself is rooted in an innate belief in the power of individual initiative rather than the supremacy of group action – which inspired Marxism and Communism. Philosophy can be mind numbingly boring. But it can help us more clearly see the path to a better world. The mid-20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger had a favorite term, “Dasein,” which cannot be translated precisely into a single English word. The rough meaning is “being-in-the-world,” Heidegger’s description of human existence. Heidegger’s most important point was that it is impossible to separate a person from the earth. Without the “world,” a human being could not know, grow or even live. A person is like a tree planted in the earth; without the earth, the tree could not exist. But there is a second implication to Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” bumper sticker. To be in the world is also to be “in common with other beings.” Whether we like it or not, we live in a natural state of dependence upon one another. Put another way, it is impossible to accurately define existence without affirming our dependence not only upon the earth, but also upon our fellow human beings. Was the German philosopher, who lived through World War II without standing up to Nazism’s atrocities, a closet environmentalist and a globalist before his time? Why is this somewhat obvious definition of human existence important to our world today? Many theories of human progress are rooted in a moral imperative. The Christian practice of charity is premised on the religious conviction that we are all God’s children and equal members of the human family. Therefore we are obligated to donate, assist and help others in need. Christians are also challenged to respect nature as God’s creation. This implies that charity and environmentalism are a sacrifice rather than a reflection of our collective self-interest. The truth is exactly the opposite. Protecting the earth and uniting the planet is the only logical political agenda of Dasein. In Jeffrey Sachs’ 2008 book “Common Wealth,” he argues that “the defining challenge of the 21st century will be to face the reality that humanity shares a common fate on a crowded planet.” Sachs, director of Columbia University’s Earth Institute, cites four imperatives for world leaders to address: 1) Pressure on the earth’s ecosystems will produce climate change and species extinction. 2) Population growth will tax the earth. 3) The unequal distribution of wealth across the world is untenable. 4) Failed institutions impair vital global cooperation and problem solving. Last week, Russia invaded Georgia, sparking fears of a reconstituted cold war. The assault belied the presumption that the world was moving beyond nationalism. Fundamental conflicts between Islamic and Western cultures still dominate global politics. Despite a growing consensus on the need for international efforts to curb emissions and develop clean energy, the earth still reels from pollution. Poverty and sickness in sub-Saharan Africa contradict the image of a world that has conquered disease and hunger. And thousands of nuclear bombs still have the unthinkable power to destroy the earth and the entire human race. Those who thought that war and hunger would be easily conquered by science are slowly realizing that our toughest challenges are ahead. Perhaps we need to be reminded of Heidegger’s truth: **No “world,” no “being,”** no “we,” no “I.”

#### 6. Can’t solve calc thought --- too entrenched

Riis 11—Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Søren, 8 February 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,”)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell.

#### 7. Abandoning management causes extinction

Soulé 95– Natural Resources Professor, California (Michael and Gary Lease, Reinventing Nature?, p 159-60, AG)

The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect—nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given nature's current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change.' For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring—in today's parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature.

#### 8. Turn - Waiting for a new ontology is a strategy that dooms us to nuclear omnicide and makes all the aff and neg impacts inevitable.

Santoni ‘85 (Ronald E., Philosophy Professor @ Denison, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often-stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

### Elections 2ac

#### Romney won’t hurt relations

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The dilemma faced by Putin, and many other world leaders, is to decide who they would rather do business with. Obama’s relationship with Putin got off to a frosty start when Obama visited Moscow in 2009. And no matter how badly Obama may want to salvage what he can of the reset, the camaraderie he developed with Medvedev will not be duplicated once Putin is back in the presidential chair. Meanwhile, Romney has taken a sharply anti-Russian line, particularly in recent days, identifying Russia as the premier geopolitical threat to the United States. But it bears noting that as a candidate, George W. Bush expressed similar skepticism on Russia before developing a close personal connection with Putin after the Ljubljana summit in the summer of 2001.

#### US-Russia relations don’t solve global problems

Ostapenko ‘09 (E., Trend Daily News, Turkish Weekly, “Normalization In U.s.-russian Relations Not To Change Political Situation In World: Analyst At French Studies Institute” 7-8, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/83734/-normalization-in-u-s-russian-relations-not-to-change-political-situation-in-world-analyst-at-french-studies-institute-.html)

Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance and will not change the situation in the world, since today Russia does not play the role it played formerly, Dominic Moisi, analyst on Russian-American relations, said. "There is a country that is essential for the future of the world, it is not Russia, but it is China," Moisi, founder and senior advisor at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), told [Trend News](http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/83734/%22http%3A/news.trend.az%22) in a telephone conversation from Paris Speaking of the growing role of China, Moisi said that the Chinese are soon going to be the number two economy in the world. Russian economy can not compete. As another important aspect of the increasing weight of China in the world, Moisi considers the absence of problems with the aging of population, unlike European countries, including Russia.

#### Obama’s reset policies embolden Russia

**Mitchell, ’09** – president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (A. Wess, July 6, 2009, Stiffening the Russia Reset,
[http://www.realclearworld.com/ articles/2009/07/06/ stiffening\_the\_russia\_reset\_ 96881.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/06/stiffening_the_russia_reset_96881.html))

And herein lies the real danger of Obama's unfolding Russia policy: The very maneuvers - conciliatory posturing, prioritizing START - that are meant to entice Russia cooperation may actually lead Moscow to behave less predictably. To the Kremlin, Washington's emphasis on "resetting" relations look like an admission of guilt for 20 years of Western "encirclement." This is a dangerous signal to send when the regime is seeking to shore up its power base following the economic downturn. Should Moscow see in Obama's actions an America that is chastened and needful, it could sense a widened margin of error - for cracking down on dissidents, annexing the Crimea or even invading Georgia again.

***That causes global nuclear war***

**Blank 9** – Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. **Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives**. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,

But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

#### Romney averts economic collapse

Weisenthal ‘12

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May 12, 2012, Business Insider, It's More Clear Than Ever That If Romney Loses, The Economy Is Going To Implode <http://www.businessinsider.com/only-mitt-romney-can-stave-off-a-new-debt-ceiling-fiasco-2012-5>, jj

It's More Clear Than Ever That If Romney Loses, The Economy Is Going To Implode Back in April we made the argument that a Mitt Romney win would be better for the economy, based on fairly simple logic: A Mitt Romney victory would see higher government deficits, which is just what this struggling economy needs right now to regain full health. If Obama wins, there's a good chance that we'll fly off the fiscal cliff, as the political gridlock will see spending cuts kick in, and perhaps even higher taxes. If Romney wins, not only will taxes stay low, Republicans will drop their opposition to government spending and deficits. That's because parties in power always support higher deficits and spending. It's just what they do. We'd love to hear someone say with a straight face that Republicans, if given full power, would seriously stick to their principles of limiting government. Opposing deficits is strictly the purview of the opposition party. So the Keynesian choice is Romney. And as Matt Yglesias makes clear in his latest column for Slate, this choice is actually even more urgent. That's because House Republicans voted this week to renege on the debt ceiling deal made last summer. Remember as part of the deal that was made, starting in 2012 there are going to be cuts to domestic spending and military spending. But Republicans have voted to remove the military cuts, and put the entire burden on domestic spending. Those changes won't actually happen, but it's a show of extraordinarily bad faith that after that long fight that brought the country close to the brink of disaster last summer that Republicans are already trying to unwind the deal. What this means is that good faith fights over the next debt ceiling question (which will come up late this year or early next year) will be 100% impossible. As Yglesias says in the subtitle of his column: House Republicans just reneged on the debt-ceiling deal, making a default in 2013 almost inevitable. Says Yglesias: If Mitt Romney wins that may not be a problem, as he and congressional Republicans could just quickly lift the ceiling. But if Obama’s still in office, we’re looking at a potential disaster. Having won concessions by using the debt ceiling as leverage in the past, the GOP isn’t going to quietly go back to the old complain-and-agree approach. But there’s no way Democrats can bargain with a party that’s so eager to wriggle out of the terms of deals. So again, it's clear that if you want higher spending and a prevention of cataclysmic self-inflicted wounds out of Washington, Romney is the choice.

#### Obama causes defense cuts

Dreazen ‘12

Yochi Dreazen is a senior correspondent (military affairs and national security) for National Journal. 6-8-12, the Atlantic, How Obama and Romney Differ—and Don't—on Foreign Policy <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/how-obama-and-romney-differ-and-dont-on-foreign-policy/258283/>, jj

National-security and foreign-policy issues are taking a clear backseat to the economy in this year's presidential election. That's a shame, because the candidates offer voters clear choices on issues like the size of the armed forces and whether the U.S. should go it alone in dealing with Syria. At the same time, there is little daylight between them on the two most important national-security questions of the moment: the pace of the troop drawdown in Afghanistan and how far Washington should go to restrain Iran's nuclear ambitions. DOLLARS AND CENTS Romney and Obama have clashed over a pair of fundamental and complicated questions. First, in this era of diminished resources, what kind of role should the U.S. military play in the world? And second, can--or should--the United States continue to shoulder its long-standing duty as the world's policeman? Obama offers one set of answers to those questions. In December 2009, the president traveled to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point to announce his plan to surge 33,000 troops into Afghanistan. He promised, though, that he wouldn't keep troops there indefinitely because, simply put, the financial costs were too high. "I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests," he said, noting that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had already cost the United States $1 trillion that could have been spent at home. "We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy.... We can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars." The president has since announced plans to shave $487 billion from the Pentagon's budget over the next decade, partly by cutting 100,000 ground troops and buying fewer next-generation Air Force fighters and Navy warships. The "sequester," or across-the-board automatic budget reductions, slated to kick in at the end of the year will slice another $500 billion from Defense Department coffers. Obama has made it clear that he doesn't want to see those cuts take effect, but he says he's willing to suffer the consequences rather than let Congress off the hook on a deficit-reduction deal. He says he would veto Republican efforts to remove the defense cuts from the sequester. Romney has a starkly different national-defense philosophy. He has promised to reverse what he calls Obama's "massive" defense cuts and boost the Pentagon's budget. The presumptive GOP nominee says he wants to add 100,000 ground troops, increase the Navy's ship-buying budget from nine to 15 vessels a year, and maintain the current fleet of carrier battle groups, the most powerful--and most expensive--weapon in the U.S. seaborne arsenal. The Republican also wants to purchase more F-35s, a next-generation model of amazingly advanced, but staggeringly expensive, stealth warplanes.

#### Defense cuts trigger cause prolif and nuclear war

Kagan ’11 (Robert, 1-24, The Weekly Standard, Vol 16, No 18, “The Price of Power,” <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=2>, jj)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. ***If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons.*** • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. ***In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless***. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be.

#### Obama re-election signals weakness and invites nuclear aggression --- Romney solves

Richard Williamson served as the president's special envoy to Sudan from 2007 to 2009, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from 1987 to 1989, and served in the Reagan White House as an assistant to the president from 1981 to 1983.

4-26-12, Foreign Policy, Obama's Jimmy Carter Moment <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/25/obama_s_jimmy_carter_moment>, jj

North Korea's impending nuclear test is just the latest illustration of Barack Obama's weakness and naiveté abroad. In recent weeks, North Korea tested a long-range missile that could someday hold a nuclear warhead and threaten American shores. It is preparing to test a nuclear device for a third time. We are entering an exceptionally dangerous period, one that has us "within an inch of war," according to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It is difficult to know what kinds of calculations or miscalculations North Korea's young new leader and his entourage might make in the period ahead. But there are other reasons for worry far from the corridors of power in Pyongyang. The last weeks and months have exposed profound dysfunction in the corridors of Washington where U.S. foreign and defense policy are formulated. With President Obama's foreign policy unraveling, his reelection campaign has been quick to attack Mitt Romney as a distraction. But events abroad may be bringing us to a juncture at which the inexperience and incompetence of a presidency crystallizes in the public mind. In short, we are approaching a Jimmy Carter moment. In a perilous world, this is not the kind of leadership our country needs. The case of North Korea illustrates a foreign policy untethered from any overarching strategy. All recent administrations have wrestled with the challenges posed by the predictably unpredictable regime in Pyongyang. But few administrations have taken a sucker punch like the one delivered on April 14, when North Korea tested a long-range missile. The North Korean missile launch may have failed in its purported objective of putting a satellite into space, but it certainly succeeded in its political objective of knocking the United States off guard. It was only weeks earlier, after all, that the Obama administration decided to trust the new leader and reached an agreement with North Korea promising food aid in exchange for halting missile tests and some enrichment activities. But it was no sooner agreed to than violated. By extending an olive branch to Pyongyang only to have it snapped off at the stem, the Obama administration's singular achievement was to showcase its own naiveté and weakness. The trouble with naiveté and weakness is that they tempt aggression, which brings us to Syria. There Bashar al-Assad, another scion of a dictator, continues the carnage that has already taken some 9,000 lives and left so many others maimed by shellfire and torture. This has been going on for over a year. Here we get a clear picture of the Obama Doctrine in action: one part bluster, one part incoherence, and one part paralysis. When the carnage began, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton downplayed the Syrian regime's brutality, emphasizing that many in Washington saw Assad as a "reformer." As the carnage continued unabated, she stated that "world opinion is not going to stand idly by." But in both instances, standing idly is exactly what "world opinion" -- supposedly led by the Obama administration -- has done. Iran is the third corner in this triangle of foreign-policy failure. The basic fact is that the regime in Tehran is racing forward with its nuclear arms program. For more than three years, the Obama administration has ineptly pushed various buttons and pulled various levers, from engagement to belated sanctions and now back to engagement, without any sign that it is making progress toward its stated objective of stopping the Iranian bomb-building project. Its only accomplishment has been to give the ayatollahs time to enrich uranium, harden bunkers, and come closer to a nuclear weapons capability than ever before. President Obama's lack of resolute action and the absence of demonstrable results make hollow his declaration that a nuclear-armed Iran is "unacceptable." The path he has set us on leads to a nuclear-armed Iran. And once that occurs, the unacceptable will -- to Barack Obama -- become the accepted. Jimmy Carter's stewardship of foreign affairs came to a culmination in the twin disasters of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage drama. We can only hope that the final months of Barack Obama's term are not an occasion for similar disasters. But what his record underscores is the urgency of putting new and stronger leadership in the White House. Events are demonstrating on an almost daily basis that the team running the show is far out of its depth. A Mitt Romney presidency will not come a day too soon.

#### Impact is nuclear war

Ben Coes 9-30-11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, & author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world. In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

#### Perception of Obama win causes Israel to strike Iran

Poor ‘12

Jeff Poor covers the media for The Daily Caller. The Daily Caller, 7-8-12, Krauthammer: Israelis will attack Iran if they think Obama will win re-election, <http://dailycaller.com/2012/07/08/krauthammer-israelis-will-attack-iran-if-they-think-obama-will-win-re-election/#ixzz23dBw4BGG>, jj

On Friday’s “Special Report,” Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer warned that Americans should expect Israel to attack Iran if President Barack Obama’s re-election appears likely. Krauthammer explained that there could be a punitive response from the Obama administration, which would be less likely before he is re-elected. “If they think Obama will win reelection I think it’s likely they will attack before, because afterwards there is no way to tell how Obama would punish Israel and they would be vulnerable to sanctions and other measure of the United States,” he said. Krauthammer reminded viewers of the time frame advanced by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta earlier this year, and explained how that is a sign that “the clock is running.” “The window is between now — remember, the Secretary of Defense said earlier in year that Israel would have attacked by now, attack in April, May, June,” he continued. “The clock is running. They are simply waiting to make sure that the sham negotiations are declared over, rather than put on life support — to say all options have been tried and now we have to defend ourselves.”

#### The impact is great power wars and the global economy

Trabanco 09(Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.